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INTRODUCTION 
On July 14, 2015, the United States of America, the European 
Union, the United Kingdom, Russia, and China reached a historic 
agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran that will limit Iran’s 
nuclear program to peaceful purposes only.1 The deal, known 
formally as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (“JCPOA”) and 
colloquially as the Iran nuclear accord (“Accord”), was a triumph of 
international diplomacy.2 The U.S. government expended significant 
political, economic, and diplomatic capital over several decades to 
compel Iran to negotiate.3 President Barack Obama devoted a 
substantial portion of his presidency to reaching a nuclear agreement 
with Iran that protects the national security interests of the United 
States.4 Members of Congress spent a fair portion of their time on the 
other side of the aisle, battling the very Accord that President Obama 
worked vigorously to establish.5 Despite these efforts, Congress was 
unable to pass a resolution expressing disapproval of the Accord.6 
 
 1. Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action at 2, July 14, 2015 (2015) [hereinafter 
JCPOA], http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/245317.pdf [https://perma.cc/K2AE-
APQB]. 
 2. President Barack Obama, Address at American University: Remarks by the 
President on the Iran Nuclear Deal (Aug. 5, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2015/08/05/remarks-president-iran-nuclear-deal [https://perma.cc/QMY7-NCAV] (“[I]t 
was diplomacy—hard, painstaking diplomacy—not saber-rattling, not tough talk that 
ratcheted up the pressure on Iran.”).  
 3. Parisa Hafezi et al., Iran Deal Reached, Obama Hails Step Towards ‘More 
Hopeful World,’ REUTERS (July 14, 2015, 7:25 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-
iran-nuclear-idUSKCN0PM0CE20150714 [https://perma.cc/H85M-XG3N].  
 4. See Obama, supra note 2 (discussing, in detail, the lengthy and challenging process 
that President Obama embarked upon as he sought diplomacy with Iran). 
 5. See H.R. Res. 411, 114th Cong. (2015) (declaring that President Obama had not 
complied with the procedural requirements within the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review 
Act of 2015).  
 6. H.R. Res. 3460, 114th Cong. (2015) (passing in the House but not the Senate). 
95 N.C. L. REV. 795 (2017) 
2017] STATE-SPONSORED TERROR LITIGATION 797 
The Accord took effect on January 16, 2016, at which point sanctions 
against Iran began to ease.7 
However, a towering obstacle to the Accord’s implementation 
remains lurking in the shadows of U.S. federal courts.8 As of 
November 2015, the Islamic Republic of Iran owed $43.5 billion9 to 
thousands of plaintiffs across the United States who were granted 
favorable civil judgments under the state-sponsored terror (“SST”) 
exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”), and 
this number continues to grow.10 The SST exception grants federal 
courts the power to levy judgments against designated state sponsors 
of terror for terrorist activities that harm American citizens.11 The 
Accord seemingly has no provision addressing the status of these 
judgments. Unfortunately, due to the confidential nature of the 
negotiations, it is unclear why these judgments were not resolved by 
the Accord. The judgments were likely considered off limits during 
the negotiations for fear that they would complicate the important 
goal of de-weaponizing nuclear facilities in Iran. Regardless, the 
Obama administration clearly chose to prioritize foreign policy 
objectives over the legal issues looming in the background. 
At the time the SST exception to the FSIA was drafted in 1996, 
vigorous debate surrounded its utility, enforceability, and the risk of 
reciprocal litigation it created.12 Central to this debate was the 
balance of power between plaintiffs, who sought compensation for 
injuries at the hands of terrorists, and the executive branch, which 
remained wary of losing control over foreign policy objectives and 
 
 7. JCPOA Implementation, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY (Jan. 16, 2016), https://www
.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/jcpoa_implementation.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/HN26-ZF3G]. Implementation day occurred upon a finding that Iran had 
sufficiently curbed its nuclear program. Id. 
 8. There is no denying that other obstacles to the Accord emerge with each passing 
day, but this Comment focuses on an obstacle that is both clear and movable. See, e.g., 
Rick Gladstone, 76 Experts Urge Donald Trump to Keep Iran Deal, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 
2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/15/world/middleeast/trump-iran-deal.html?smprod
=nytcore-iphone&smid=nytcore-iphone-share&_r=0 [https://perma.cc/S5X7-JUA8].  
 9. Justice Forsaken: How the Federal Government Fails American Victims of Iranian 
and Palestinian Terrorism: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight, Agency Action, 
Fed. Rights, & Fed. Courts of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 2 (2015) 
(statement of Orde F. Kittrie, Professor of Law, Arizona State University); see also ORDE 
KITTRIE, CTR. ON SANCTIONS & ILLICIT FIN., AFTER SUPREME COURT DECISION, IRAN 
STILL OWES $53 BILLION IN UNPAID U.S. COURT JUDGMENTS TO AMERICAN VICTIMS 
OF IRANIAN TERRORISM 1 (2016), http://www.defenddemocracy.org/content/uploads
/documents/Kittrie_After_SCOTUS_Iran_Owes.pdf [https://perma.cc/U7U9-UFBZ].  
 10. See, e.g., In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, No. 03-MDL-1570, 2016 
WL 1029552, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2016) (over $10 billion awarded against Iran).  
 11. 28 U.S.C. §	1605A (2012). 
 12. See infra Section I.D. 
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initiatives. Today, the SST exception to the FSIA once again poses a 
substantial obstacle to the executive’s foreign policy objectives, this 
time in the form of an obstacle to the President’s ability to implement 
the Accord, and more broadly, to normalize relations with Iran.13 This 
Comment explores the historical development of the SST exception, 
examines obstacles posed by SST judgments in the context of recent 
diplomatic developments, and suggests methods by which those 
obstacles can be circumvented by both the President and Iran while 
also ensuring that plaintiffs are justly compensated. 
This Comment is undergirded by three key goals: First, state 
sponsors of terror should receive their “just deserts.”14 Second, under 
the existing statutory scheme, victims of terrorism ought to receive 
some level of compensation for the harms they have suffered. Third, 
all the while, neither the pursuit of a “more practical, more attainable 
peace” with Iran should be sacrificed nor should the President 
compromise its foreign policy flexibility.15 This Comment synthesizes 
these goals—revealing that the inherent tension between them does 
not render them mutually exclusive.16 
Part I gives context. This Part provides a detailed overview of the 
Accord and the SST exception to the FSIA. Part II discusses the 
judgments that are currently pending against Iran and exposes the 
latent link between the judgments and the Accord. This Part 
considers the obstacles to diplomacy created by outstanding 
 
 13. For purposes of this Comment, normalization of relations refers to efforts to 
resume peaceful diplomatic relations between the United States and Iran. For a thoughtful 
analysis of how SST judgments pending against Cuba are likely to inhibit attempts at 
normalization between Cuba and the United States, see generally Andrew Lyubarsky, 
Note, Clearing the Road to Havana: Settling Legally Questionable Terrorism Judgments to 
Ensure Normalization of Relations Between the United States and Cuba, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
458 (2016).  
 14. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. IV, at 121 (Robert Williams trans., 1869) 
(c. 384 B.C.E.). “Just deserts” is “the punishment that a person deserves for having 
committed a crime.” Just Deserts, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 15. President John F. Kennedy, Commencement Address at American University: 
Towards a Strategy of Peace (June 10, 1963) [hereinafter Towards a Strategy of Peace], 
http://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/mod/1963Kennedy-peacestrat.html [https://perma.cc/X8JA-
W7ND]. President Obama invoked these very words upon his acceptance of the Nobel 
Peace Prize and, once again, after finalizing the Accord. President Barack Obama, 
Remarks by the President at the Acceptance of the Nobel Peace Prize in Oslo, Nor. (Dec. 
10, 2009), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-acceptance-nobel-
peace-prize [https://perma.cc/5D4M-EYWM]; Obama, supra note 2.  
 16. In the words of President John F. Kennedy, “Our problems are manmade; 
therefore they can be solved by man. And man can be as big as he wants. No problem of 
human destiny is beyond human beings. Man’s reason and spirit have often solved the 
seemingly unsolvable, and we believe they can do it again.” Towards a Strategy of Peace, 
supra note 15.  
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judgments against Iran. Part III argues that Iran should show up in 
court. This Part proposes methods by which Iran can mitigate the 
effects of SST litigation on the Accord. Part IV presents solutions. 
This Part identifies action that the United States can take to protect 
the Accord from SST judgments. 
I.  THE IRAN NUCLEAR ACCORD, THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN 
IMMUNITIES ACT, AND THE STATE-SPONSORED TERROR 
EXCEPTION 
A. The Iran Nuclear Accord 
The path to the Accord was tumultuous and uncertain.17 Some 
view the Accord as the culmination of years of international sanctions 
against Iran that successfully forced the Iranian regime to the 
negotiating table.18 To others, however, the Accord is better than no 
deal, but remains imperfect.19 Still, others believe that any deal with 
Iran is a deal with the “devil.”20 Putting aside normative perspectives 
on the Accord, one aspect is indisputable—the United States 
expended sums of political, economic, and diplomatic capital to bring 
it to fruition. President Obama, in particular, expended substantial 
political energy, will, and capital as he sought to realize one of his top 
foreign policy objectives.21 
 
 17. Kate Lyons, Iran Nuclear Talks: Timeline, GUARDIAN (July 14, 2015, 3:45 PM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/02/iran-nuclear-talks-timeline [https://
perma.cc/6WZA-J6K7] (detailing the lengthy negotiations); see also Jethro Mullen & Nic 
Robertson, Landmark Deal Reached on Iran Nuclear Program, CNN (July 14, 2015, 11:08 
PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/07/14/politics/iran-nuclear-deal/ [https://perma.cc/LX9P-
8N6Y] (describing the twenty month negotiations as “arduous”). 
 18. See, e.g., 161 CONG. REC. H5909–10 (2015) (statement of Rep. Van Hollen) 
(“[F]or years, the Congress, the President, our European partners, and the international 
community have imposed a series of tough economic sanctions on Iran with the goal of 
preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. Those sanctions brought Iran to the 
negotiating table and I commend President Obama, Secretary Kerry, and the entire team, 
along with our P5+1 partners, for their efforts to negotiate an agreement to prevent Iran 
from building a nuclear weapon.”). 
 19. Id. at H5898 (statement of Rep. Becerra) (“No deal is perfect. We can all think of 
ways of making a deal better. But thinking is not doing, and speculation won’t stop Iran 
from reaching a nuclear weapons capability.”). 
 20. See id. at H5908 (statement of Rep. Weber) (“This is a bad deal. You don’t argue, 
you don’t make deals with the devil, deals with the enemy. Do we not learn from 
history?”). 
 21. See President Barack Obama, Statement by the President on Iran (July 14, 2015), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/07/14/statement-president-iran [https://
perma.cc/6RRP-JYVR] (“Today after two years of negotiations the United States, 
together with our international partners, has achieved something that decades of 
animosity has not—a comprehensive, long-term deal with Iran that will prevent it from 
95 N.C. L. REV. 795 (2017) 
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Though this Comment will not elaborate on the Accord’s details, 
understanding the momentous nature of the agreement is key to 
understanding why the obstacles to its implementation must be 
removed.22 In broad strokes, the Accord seeks to increase stability in 
the Middle East by de-weaponizing Iranian nuclear facilities for a 
period of at least fifteen years.23 Beyond the concrete goals of 
regulating Iran’s nuclear facilities, the Accord also seeks less tangible 
results, such as Iran’s reintegration into the international economic 
community and the opportunity for American soft power to provide 
leverage for regime change from within Iran.24 From the Iranian 
perspective, the benefits of the bargain include decreased sanctions, 
the release of seized Iranian assets, and an improved economic 
outlook.25 Of course, the Iranian regime likely remains reluctant to 
resume unbounded trade with the West for fear of eroding control 
over Islamic cultural underpinnings—and, more practically, to 
maintain the Revolutionary Guards’ control over the Iranian 
economy.26 The consequences will likely be severe if either party fails 
 
obtaining a nuclear weapon.”). See generally Obama, supra note 2 (discussing, in detail, 
the lengthy and challenging process that President Obama embarked upon as he sought 
diplomacy with Iran).  
 22. For more detailed information about the Accord, see The Historic Deal That Will 
Prevent Iran from Acquiring a Nuclear Weapon, WHITE HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse
.gov/issues/foreign-policy/iran-deal [https://perma.cc/UU8H-2M63]. 
 23. The deal caps uranium enrichment at 3.67% and limits the stockpile to 300 
kilograms, all for fifteen years. JCPOA, supra note 1, at 7. Iran will be required to ship 
spent fuel out of the country forever, as well as allow officials from the IAEA certain 
access for inspection. Id. at 8–9. Heightened inspections, including tracking uranium 
mining and monitoring the production and storage of centrifuges, will last for up to 
twenty-five years. Id. at 9. These measures are projected to severely inhibit Iran’s ability to 
produce a nuclear weapon. See id. at 2 (The JCPOA will “ensure that Iran’s nuclear 
programme will be exclusively peaceful, and mark a fundamental shift in their approach to 
this issue” and anticipating “that full implementation of this JCPOA will positively 
contribute to regional and international peace and security. Iran reaffirms that under no 
circumstances will Iran ever seek, develop or acquire any nuclear weapons	.	.	.	. Iran 
envisions that this JCPOA will allow it to move forward with an exclusively peaceful, 
indigenous nuclear programme	.	.	.	.”); Mullen & Robertson, supra note 17 (“The U.S. 
estimates that the new measures take Iran from being able to assemble its first bomb 
within 2–3 months, to at least one year from now.”). 
 24. See infra Section II.C. 
 25. Jackie Northam, Lifting Sanctions Will Release $100 Billion to Iran. Then What?, 
NPR (July 16, 2015, 3:53 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2015/07/16/423562391
/lifting-sanctions-will-release-100-billion-to-iran-then-what [https://perma.cc/2NT4-RKH4] 
(noting that approximately $100 billion will be released to Iran once the Accord is 
implemented). 
 26. See Gerald F. Seib, Will Iran Hard-Liners Buy Economic Opening?, WALL ST. J. 
(Nov. 2, 2015, 9:25 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/iran-hard-liners-say-no-thanks-to-
economic-opening-1446481974; see also Benoit Faucon, Stacy Meichtry & Asa Fitch, 
Iran’s Government and Revolutionary Guards Battle for Control of Economy, WALL ST. J. 
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to comply with the standards set out in the Accord: sanctions will 
likely be reinstated,27 Iran will likely resume unregulated production 
of enriched uranium,28 and the risk of a military confrontation will 
increase.29 As a result, many view the Accord as a cornerstone of the 
United States’ national security and regional security in the Middle 
East, and as one of the most important foreign policy achievements of 
the Obama administration.30 However, the SST exception to the FSIA 
may derail this delicate arrangement. 
B. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 
Before considering the exception to sovereign immunity 
embodied by the SST exception, it is important to understand the 
general rule that sovereigns are immune from suit by foreign 
citizens.31 Chief Justice John Marshall first articulated the rule of 
absolute immunity for foreign nations against civil suits in the United 
States in The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon.32 This early view, 
known as the classical theory of sovereign immunity, held that all 
sovereigns were equal, and therefore no sovereign could exercise 
jurisdiction over another.33 In 1952, the State Department advised the 
U.S. Attorney General Philip Perlman to adopt a more restrictive 
 
(May 18, 2016, 11:15 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/irans-government-and-
revolutionary-guards-battle-for-control-of-economy-1463584510.  
 27. In late 2016, the House and the Senate passed a bill that extends the President’s 
authority to impose sanctions on Iran for another decade. H.R. 6297, 114th Cong. (2016). 
The bill became law on December 15, 2016. Iran Sanctions Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 
114-277, 130 Stat. 1409. 
 28. Just before reaching the final stages of the Accord, Iran continued to threaten 
resumption of enriched uranium production if the Accord did not succeed. Iran Would 
Resume Enrichment if Nuclear Talks Fail: Minister, REUTERS (June 12, 2014, 4:42 PM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-idUSKBN0EN2EJ20140612 [https://perma.cc
/Z97M-W7Y9].  
 29. See JCPOA, supra note 1, at 17–18. 
 30. See 161 CONG. REC. H5900–02 (2015) (statement of Rep. Pelosi). 
 31. Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 11 (D.D.C. 1998) (citing Saudi 
Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 355 (1993)) (“This Court lacks jurisdiction over this matter 
unless it falls within one of the FSIA’s enumerated exceptions to foreign sovereign 
immunity.”). 
 32. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). Chief Justice Marshall noted that foreign sovereign 
immunity is rooted in “perfect equality and absolute independence of sovereigns, and [a] 
common interest impelling them to mutual intercourse, and an interchange of good offices 
with each other.” Id. at 137; see also Flatow, 999 F. Supp. at 11. 
 33. Jeewon Kim, Comment, Making State Sponsors of Terrorism Pay: A Separation of 
Powers Discourse Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 22 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 
513, 513 (2004). See generally JAMES COOPER-HILL, THE LAW OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
AND TERRORISM (2006) (detailing the development of the terrorism exception and anti-
terror litigation); HAZEL FOX, THE LAW OF STATE IMMUNITY (2002) (providing an 
overview of sovereign immunity).  
95 N.C. L. REV. 795 (2017) 
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theory of sovereign immunity.34 Specifically, this restrictive theory 
would recognize immunity only for the public activities of states, 
rather than for their private and commercial activities.35 Under this 
theory, foreign sovereigns were exposed to subject matter jurisdiction 
in American courts for activities such as international contracts and 
loan repayment.36 This more restrictive theory was developed to level 
the playing field when private American citizens contracted with 
companies operated by socialist governments.37 Ultimately, the 
restrictive theory of sovereign immunity became preeminent in the 
United States.38 
Prior to the passage of the FSIA, immunity decisions were often 
made unilaterally by the Department of State. In passing the FSIA in 
1976, Congress sought to transfer state immunity decisions from the 
executive branch to the judiciary, in part because Congress 
considered the judiciary less susceptible to political pressure.39 
Originally, exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity were restricted 
to matters such as commercial disputes or matters where the foreign 
sovereign waived immunity.40 Therefore, when the FSIA was 
originally passed, there was no right of action against foreign 
sovereigns for state-sponsored crimes such as torture or terrorism.41 
This changed with the passage of the SST exception. 
 
 34. Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Philip B. 
Perlman, U.S. Att’y Gen. (May 19, 1952), reprinted in Changing Policy Concerning the 
Granting of Sovereign Immunity to Foreign Governments, 26 DEP’T ST. BULL. 984, 984–85 
(1952) [hereinafter Tate Letter].  
 35. Id.; see also Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Note, A Critique of the Terrorism 
Exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 887, 892 
(2002).  
 36. See Flatow, 999 F. Supp. at 11 (stating that courts “steadfastly refused to extend 
the FSIA as originally enacted beyond commercial activities”). State public activities were 
thought to be “those acts arising from internal administrative acts of a government, 
legislative acts, acts involving armed forces, acts involving diplomatic activity, and public 
loans.” Margot C. Wuebbels, Note, Commercial Terrorism: A Commercial Activity 
Exception Under §	1605(a)(2) of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 
1123, 1125 (1993). Conversely, private activities “were defined as acts of industrial, 
commercial, financial, or any other business enterprises in which private persons may 
engage, or an act connected with such an enterprise.” Id.  
 37. Gartenstein-Ross, supra note 35, at 893 (“Continued U.S. commitment to absolute 
sovereign immunity would have produced an inequitable situation where private U.S. 
companies were amendable to suit in foreign courts, while socialist countries’ state trading 
companies were immune to suit in the United States, even if they had, for example, 
breached their contracts with U.S. firms.” (citing Tate Letter, supra note 34, at 985)).  
 38. Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 487–88 (1983).  
 39. See id. at 493; see also Kim, supra note 33, at 514. 
 40. Gartenstein-Ross, supra note 35, at 895. 
 41. This rule was applied strictly. Pan Am Flight 103 crashed into the hamlet of 
Lockerbie, Scotland, during a flight between London and New York City when a plastic 
95 N.C. L. REV. 795 (2017) 
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C. The State-Sponsored Terror Exception 
In 1996, Congress added another exception to the general rule 
guaranteeing immunity for foreign states. Congress passed the SST 
exception as part of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”).42 The exception grants U.S. federal courts 
jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns when a claim satisfies five 
elements: (1) the claim must involve torture, extrajudicial killing, 
aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of material support 
or resources for such acts; (2) the act or provision of material support 
must be engaged in by an official, employee, or agent of the foreign 
state acting within the scope of his or her duty; (3) the Secretary of 
State must have designated the defendant state as a state sponsor of 
terrorism, either at the time the act occurred or as a result of the act; 
(4) either the claimant or victim must have been a U.S. citizen when 
the act occurred; and (5) if the act occurred in the defendant state, the 
claimant must have in good faith explored the legal remedies 
available in the state and given the state a reasonable opportunity to 
arbitrate the claim.43 
In addition to the jurisdictional extension pursuant to AEDPA, 
Congress passed the Civil Liability Act as part of AEDPA. The Civil 
Liability Act, sometimes referred to as the Flatow Amendment, 
created a private right of action for U.S. citizens to recover civil 
judgments against sovereigns sued under the SST exception.44 The 
 
explosive detonated on board, killing 270 people. Terrorist Bombing of Pan Am Flight 
103, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (Nov. 21, 2012, 8:28 AM), https://www.cia.gov
/about-cia/cia-museum/experience-the-collection/text-version/stories/terrorist-bombing-of-
pan-am-flight-103.html [https://perma.cc/T3TR-H7MN]. The CIA later determined that 
Libya was responsible for the bombing. Id. The rule was applied so strictly that the 
families of victims of this bombing were unable to sue Libya for its involvement because 
terrorist activities carried out by a foreign sovereign did not fit within one of the 
exceptions to the FSIA. See Smith v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 886 F. 
Supp. 306, 315 (E.D.N.Y. 1995), aff’d, 101 F.3d 239 (2d Cir. 1996). These plaintiffs were 
ultimately successful after the SST exception was passed. See Rein v. Socialist People’s 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 162 F.3d 748, 753–55 (2d. Cir. 1998).  
 42. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 
104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).  
 43. 28 U.S.C. §	1605A(a) (2012). 
 44. Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, §	589, 110 
Stat. 3009, 3009–172 (1996) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §	1605 note (2012)) (passing 
the “Civil Liability for Acts of State Sponsored Terrorism”) (stating that “an official, 
employee, or agent of a foreign state designated as a state sponsor of terrorism	.	.	.	while 
acting within the scope of his or her office, employment, or agency shall be liable to a 
United States national	.	.	.	for personal injury or death caused by acts of that official, 
employee, or agent for which the courts of the United States may maintain jurisdiction 
under [former] section 1605(a)(7) of title 28 of the United States Code, for money 
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Flatow Amendment was inspired by the efforts of Stephen Flatow, 
whose daughter, Alisa Flatow, was killed in a suicide bombing 
committed by Hamas while she was studying abroad in Israel.45 
Stephen Flatow lobbied Congress to pass what became known as the 
Flatow Amendment.46 
Together, the SST exception and the Flatow Amendment allow 
U.S. federal courts and even state courts47 to hear lawsuits against 
foreign sovereigns that have been designated state sponsors of 
terror.48 This expansive jurisdictional reach would have shocked Chief 
Justice Marshall and other adherents to the classical theory of 
sovereign immunity because it erodes the notion of sovereign 
equality.49 The Flatow Amendment even changes the types of 
damages that can be awarded against sovereign nations. Prior to the 
amendment, the FSIA expressly prohibited punitive damages against 
sovereign nations under any of its exceptions.50 However, the Flatow 
Amendment permitted courts, for the first time ever, to award 
punitive damages to plaintiffs who sue foreign sovereigns under the 
FSIA.51 
The punitive damages authorized by the Flatow Amendment 
quickly resulted in inflated judgments. Following the Flatow 
Amendment’s passage, Alisa Flatow’s father filed a lawsuit against 
Iran pursuant to the newly granted jurisdictional reach. In Flatow v. 
Islamic Republic of Iran,52 $225 million in punitive damages were 
levied against Iran for the death of Alisa Flatow.53 Notably, these 
punitive damages were supplemental to the $20 million in 
 
damages which may include economic damages, solatium, pain, and suffering, and punitive 
damages	.	.	.	.”).  
 45. See Joseph Keller, The Flatow Amendment and State-Sponsored Terrorism, 28 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1029, 1031 (2005); see also Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. 
Supp. 1, 12–13 (D.D.C. 1998) (explaining the history and development of the Flatow 
Amendment). 
 46. See Richard T. Micco, Note, Putting the Terrorist-Sponsoring State in the Dock: 
Recent Changes in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and the Individual’s Recourse 
Against Foreign Powers, 14 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 109, 110 n.7 (2000). 
 47. See Lyubarsky, supra note 13, at 473–79 (discussing the jurisdictional issues 
associated with state court rulings against Cuba pursuant to the SST exception).  
 48. But see Keller, supra note 45, at 1031–32 (arguing that the Flatow Amendment 
does not provide a cause of action against a given foreign state itself, but only against a 
foreign state’s “officials, employees, or agents”). 
 49. See supra notes 32–33 and accompanying text. 
 50. Keller, supra note 45, at 1031.  
 51. Civil Liability for Acts of State Sponsored Terrorism, Pub. L. No. 104-208, §	589, 
110 Stat. 3009, 3009–172 (1996) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §	1605 note (2012)).  
 52. 999 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1998).  
 53. Id. at 5. Such a figure represented over three times the total amount of Iranian 
expenditures that purportedly went to terrorist groups in that year. Id. at 32–34.  
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compensation awarded to the Flatow family for the value of Alisa’s 
life.54 Awarding such extravagant damages is one thing, but collecting 
on them is quite another. The next Section discusses the legal 
machinery involved in collecting these damage awards. 
1.  The Machinery of Recovery 
The machinery used for recovering judgments against state 
sponsors of terror is in a constant state of flux. As plaintiffs began to 
attain monumental judgments against states like Iran and Cuba, many 
found that recovery was nearly impossible because of the difficulty of 
seizing foreign assets.55 In response, Congress passed a number of 
measures designed to assist successful plaintiffs as they grasp for 
assets belonging to judgment debtors.56 These measures and executive 
responses to these measures evince the constant tension between 
compensating SST plaintiffs and protecting key diplomatic bargaining 
tools embodied by frozen foreign assets that belong to SST 
defendants. 
The Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 
directs the U.S. Treasury—through the Office of Foreign Assets 
Control (“OFAC”)—to assist judgment creditors in recovering their 
judgments.57 As of 2014, OFAC had frozen $2.35 billion in assets 
belonging to both designated state sponsors of terror and non-state 
terrorist groups, $1.97 billion of which belonged to Iran.58 Notably, 
the amendment directing the U.S. Treasury to assist judgment 
 
 54. Id. at 1, 32; see also infra Section III.B. 
 55. JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 31258, SUITS AGAINST 
TERRORIST STATES BY VICTIMS OF TERRORISM 69–74 (2008) (comparing judgments 
rendered against terrorist states to amounts actually recovered by plaintiffs). The report 
notes that “[t]he limited availability of defendant States’ assets for satisfaction of 
judgments has made collection difficult.” Id. at i. 
 56. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §	1610(f)(2)(A) (2012) (urging the Treasury and State 
Departments to assist judgment creditors collect judgments). Note that “judgment 
debtors” refers to SST defendant states, and “judgment creditors” refers to SST plaintiffs.  
 57. Id. (“At the request of any party in whose favor a judgment has been issued with 
respect to a claim for which the foreign state is not immune under section 
1605(a)(7)	.	.	.	the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of State should make every 
effort to fully, promptly, and effectively assist any judgment creditor or any court that has 
issued any such judgment in identifying, locating, and executing against the property of 
that foreign state or any agency or instrumentality of such state.”). 
 58. OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, 
TERRORIST ASSETS REPORT: CALENDAR YEAR 2014 TWENTY-THIRD ANNUAL REPORT 
TO THE CONGRESS ON ASSETS IN THE UNITED STATES RELATING TO TERRORIST 
COUNTRIES AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM PROGRAM DESIGNEES 3, 14 tbl.1 (2014), 
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/tar2014.pdf [https://
perma.cc/5JTK-FLAE]. These assets were “blocked pursuant to economic sanctions 
imposed by the United States.” Id. at 3. 
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creditors is subject to waiver by the President “in the interest of 
national security.”59 This waiver has been exercised on at least two 
occasions, most notably when President Clinton exercised the waiver 
immediately after the passage of the amendment.60 President Clinton 
justified the waivers by noting that allowing the attachment of frozen 
assets “would impede the ability of the President to conduct foreign 
policy in the interest of national security and would, in particular, 
impede the effectiveness of such prohibitions and regulations upon 
financial transactions.”61 President Clinton also exercised a similar 
waiver provision under an earlier version of the same amendment.62 
Shortly after he exercised the earlier waiver, President Clinton 
offered prescient context: 
Absent my authority to waive section 117’s attachment 
provision, it would also effectively eliminate use of blocked 
assets of terrorist states in the national security interests of the 
United States, including denying an important source of 
leverage. In addition, section 117 could seriously affect our 
ability to enter into global claims settlements that are fair to all 
U.S. claimants, and could result in U.S. taxpayer liability in the 
event of a contrary claims tribunal judgment.63 
President Clinton’s foresight exposes the tension between creating a 
means of recovering SST judgments and the competing interest of 
protecting a substantial bargaining tool for future diplomatic 
negotiations. 
In 2002, following the September 11th attacks, Congress passed 
yet another act known as the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 
(“TRIA”), which sought to make it easier to attach the assets of 
judgment debtors.64 The purpose of TRIA was to minimize the 
executive branch’s ability to stop attachment of frozen assets by 
 
 59. §	1610(f)(3). 
 60. Presidential Determination No. 2001-03, 65 Fed. Reg. 66,483, 66,483 (Oct. 28, 
2000).  
 61. Id. 
 62. Presidential Determination No. 99-1, 63 Fed. Reg. 59,201, 59,201 (Oct. 21, 1998).  
 63. Presidential Statement on Signing the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency 
Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999, 34 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 2108, 2113 (Oct. 
23, 1998).  
 64. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, §	201, 116 Stat. 2322, 
2337 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §	1610 note (2012)); see also Ilana Arnowitz 
Drescher, Note, Seeking Justice for America’s Forgotten Victims: Reforming the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act Terrorism Exception, 15 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 791, 804 
(2012).  
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severely reducing the President’s waiver authority.65 However, TRIA 
maintained a waiver option whereby the President could block assets 
so long as an asset-by-asset analysis found that the national security 
interest required waiver of plaintiffs’ right to attachment.66 
Accordingly, though TRIA represents a good-faith attempt to 
provide remedies for victims of terrorism, Congress yet again failed to 
alleviate the burden faced by victims of terrorism seeking to actually 
recover for their tragic losses. 
A 2008 amendment to the FSIA further reduced obstacles to 
attachment by altering the “Bancec doctrine.”67 The Bancec doctrine 
required a judgment creditor to show that the debtor exercised day-
to-day control over an asset in order to attach the asset.68 The 2008 
amendment alters this standard by requiring only simple ownership 
by the judgment debtor in order for a judgment creditor to attach an 
 
 65. TRIA appears to have been a response to the President’s choice to exercise the 
waiver option in a “blanket manner.” H.R. REP. NO. 106-939, at 117–18 (2000) (Conf. 
Rep.), as reprinted in 2000 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1380, 1408–10. Although the precedent to TRIA, 
the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, did not provide express 
guidance on how or when the waiver was to be used, the House-Senate conference 
committee report shows some level of consternation over previous uses of the waiver. Id.; 
see also Lyubarsky, supra note 13, at 465.  
 66. The term “blocked asset” is defined in TRIA to mean 
(A) any asset seized or frozen by the United States under [TWEA or IEEPA]; and 
(B) does not include property that— 
(i) is subject to a license issued by the United States Government for final 
payment, transfer, or disposition by or to a person subject to the jurisdiction of 
the United States in connection with a transaction for which the issuance of 
such license has been specifically required by statute other than [IEEPA] or 
the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 (22 U.S.C. 287 et seq.); or 
(ii) in the case of property subject to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 
Relations or the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, or that enjoys 
equivalent privileges and immunities under the law of the United States, is 
being used exclusively for diplomatic or consular purposes. 
§	201(d)(2). Notably, §	201(b) of TRIA somewhat narrowed the previous waiver authority 
of the President. §	201(b) (noting that the President can only exercise the waiver with 
respect to “property subject to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations or the 
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations”). 
 67. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181, 
§	1083, 122 Stat. 3, 341–42 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §	1610(g)(1)(A)–(E) (2012)).  
 68. See First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 
611, 626–27 (1983) (recognizing a presumption that a foreign government’s determination 
that its instrumentality should be accorded separate legal status should be respected); see 
also Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 308 F.3d 1065, 1073–74 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(interpreting the Bancec doctrine to require proof that the judgment debtor exercised 
“day-to-day” control over to the entity in order for a judgment creditor to overcome the 
separate juridical entity presumption).  
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asset.69 Furthermore, no connection between the terrorist activity and 
the assets to be seized need be shown.70 Therefore, the commercial 
assets of judgment debtors in American banks can be attached even if 
the assets are being used for legitimate trade purposes.71 These assets 
can be attached regardless of whether the judgment debtor profits 
from or manages the assets, and regardless of whether the debtor is 
the sole beneficiary in interest of the assets.72 
In 2012, when Congress went further in its attempts to 
compensate victims of state-sponsored terror, Chief Justice John 
Roberts argued vehemently that they went too far.73 A provision of 
the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 201274 
directs Article III courts to make available for attachment a set of 
assets held in New York City on behalf of Bank Markazi, the Central 
Bank of Iran.75 The Act effectively alters the law applicable to 
attachment proceedings for a discrete subset of SST plaintiffs so that 
these plaintiffs can gain access to over $1.75 billion in bonds held in a 
New York City bank account on behalf of Iran’s Central Bank.76 
Despite serious separation-of-powers concerns,77 the law was upheld 
by the Supreme Court of the United States in Bank Markazi v. 
Peterson.78 Even so, the attached assets represent a mere drop in the 
bucket for the 1,000 plaintiffs who joined together to collect on their 
judgments. 
Most recently, Congress resorted to transferring U.S. taxpayer 
funds directly to judgment creditors to satisfy portions of their 
judgments.79 The Justice for United States Victims of State Sponsored 
Terrorism Act, signed into law by President Obama in late 2015, 
appropriates over $1 billion from the U.S. Treasury80 and calls for the 
 
 69. 28 U.S.C. §	1610(g)(1)(A)–(E) (2012). 
 70. Id. §	1610(a)–(b). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. §	1610(g)(1)(A)–(E). 
 73. See Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1329 (2016) (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting). 
 74. Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-158, 
§	502, 126 Stat. 1214, 1258 (codified at 22	U.S.C. §	8772 (2012)).  
 75. Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1316 (majority opinion). 
 76. Id. at 1329 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 77. See generally id. at 1329–38 (noting that Congress “arrogated” the “power to 
decide cases” to itself by passing the law). 
 78. 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1317 (2016) (majority opinion). 
 79. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, §	404, 129 Stat. 2242, 
3007–08 (2015) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §	10609) (passing the “Justice for 
United States Victims of State Sponsored Terrorism Act”).  
 80. Justice for United States Victims of State Sponsored Terrorism Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§	10609(e)(5) (2015). 
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appointment of a special master to allocate these funds to victims of 
state-sponsored terror.81 Victims’ maximum recovery amounts are 
capped according to the statute, but they retain the right to collect 
any unpaid amounts in alternative forums.82 Unfortunately, even this 
solution leaves many judgment creditors without a means of recovery, 
and those who do recover are recovering against the United States, 
not the nation that harmed them and their families. Thus, despite 
dogged efforts embodied by subsequent acts and amendments, 
Congress may have created a right without a practicable remedy 
when it passed the SST exception.83 Worse yet, the Justice for United 
States Victims of State Sponsored Terrorism Act shows that Congress 
has inadvertently created a right of action against the United States 
itself by allowing judgment creditors to satisfy their SST judgments 
using taxpayer dollars. 
This survey of efforts to streamline recovery of judgments 
entered pursuant to the SST exception reveals years of hardship for 
SST plaintiffs—and years of legislative revisions for the elected 
officials tasked with drafting laws that allow these plaintiffs to 
recover. Congress faces a dilemma: it must create a meaningful path 
to recovery for SST plaintiffs while avoiding the constitutional and 
policy perils that the SST exception presents, which are discussed in 
detail in the following Section. 
D. Disadvantages of the SST Exception 
Vigorous scholarly debate about the utility and wisdom of the 
SST exception accompanied its passage.84 The disadvantages of the 
 
 81. Id. §	10609(b); see also John Bellinger, Omnibus Bill Creates One Billion Dollar 
Fund for Victims of Terrorism (and Allows up to $250 Million to Go to Their Attorneys), 
LAWFARE (Dec. 28, 2015, 12:04 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/omnibus-bill-creates-
one-billion-dollar-fund-victims-terrorism-and-allows-250-million-go-their [https://perma.cc
/VQ78-2EVG]. 
 82. §	10609(d)(5)(B). 
 83. Providing a right without a remedy is a cardinal constitutional sin: “The 
Government of the United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, 
and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish 
no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 
Cranch) 137, 163 (1803). 
 84. See, e.g., S. Jason Baletsa, Comment, The Cost of Closure: A Reexamination of the 
Theory and Practice of the 1996 Amendments to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 148 
U. PA. L. REV. 1247, 1251 (2000) (arguing that the SST exception ultimately results in 
“unenforceable judgments that deny the victims’ families the closure and accountability 
they desperately need”). See generally, e.g., Gartenstein-Ross, supra note 35 (critiquing 
the SST exception and arguing the terrorist problem is best left to the political branches of 
government); Kim, supra note 33, at 514–15 (evaluating the SST exception and potential 
separation-of-powers challenges to its constitutionality). 
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SST exception have become particularly acute in light of the 
mounting judgments against Iran. Furthermore, the disadvantages of 
the SST exception interrelate with legal, constitutional, and policy 
challenges to judgments arising from the SST exception. These legal 
and constitutional infirmities provide fertile soil for settling and 
disposing of these judgments in a manner that is favorable to plaintiffs 
and diplomatically prudent. To understand the disadvantages of the 
SST exception, it is critical to first interrogate the primary purposes 
and public policy considerations that instigated its passage. 
1.  Underlying Policy Rationale 
The primary purpose of the SST exception and its accompanying 
private right of action through the Civil Liability Act is to deter state 
sponsors of terror from committing or complicity allowing violence 
against American citizens.85 The exception does so by placing foreign 
sovereigns “on notice of costs associated with terrorist conduct and 
confront[ing] them with the fact that those costs must be considered 
in deciding on future acts of terrorism.”86 
Another purpose of the SST exception is to provide 
compensation for American citizens who suffer violence at the hands 
of state sponsors of terror.87 Prior to the passage of the SST 
exception, courts regularly dismissed lawsuits against countries 
including Iran, Cuba, and Libya for terrorist acts against American 
citizens under the theory of sovereign immunity.88 The SST exception 
changed this reality, subjecting previously protected sovereigns to the 
jurisdiction of U.S. federal courts. Members of Congress relished the 
opportunity to hold state sponsors of terror accountable.89 The 
exception and subsequent Flatow Amendment are designed to allow 
for the imposition of substantial judgments through punitive damages, 
 
 85. See Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 25 (D.D.C. 1998) (stating 
that the terrorism exception “was enacted explicitly with the intent to alter the conduct of 
foreign states, particularly towards United States nationals traveling abroad”). 
 86. Brendan F. Ward, Recent Amendments to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: 
Strategic Tool, Cruel Hoax, or Untenable Impediment to Foreign Policy 7–8 (Feb. 8, 2000) 
(unpublished paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial 
satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Maritime Operations), https://
www.hsdl.org/?view&did=438697 [https://perma.cc/66X2-T6GZ].  
 87. William P. Hoye, Fighting Fire with	.	.	.	Mire? Civil Remedies and the New War on 
State-Sponsored Terrorism, 12 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 105, 116–19 (2002). 
 88. Id.; see also, e.g., Flatow, 999 F. Supp. at 13–14. 
 89. See Flatow, 999 F. Supp. at 12 (citation omitted); see also David M. Herszenhorn, 
Out of a Father’s Grief, a Fight Against Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 1999), http://www
.nytimes.com/1999/01/04/nyregion/out-of-a-father-s-grief-a-fight-against-terrorism.html [https://
perma.cc/A3N2-3GN5].  
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as discussed above, in order to ensure the deterrence purpose of the 
exception is met.90 
Outside of Congress, supporters hailed the amendment as a civil 
means of fighting terror, and as a means of providing redress and 
closure for victims of terrorism and their families.91 Others noted the 
potential for strategic and efficient use of the SST exception as a 
foreign policy tool. Brendan F. Ward, a lieutenant commander with 
the U.S. Navy, although ultimately concluding that the SST exception 
is not a useful tool, pointed out that the SST exception allows for a 
“nearly cost free” enforcement mechanism because plaintiffs’ 
attorneys are motivated by the contingency fees they will receive if 
they recover for their clients, that the exception serves an important 
deterrence purpose, and that it could be a unique avenue in the “fight 
against terrorism.”92 Despite these potential benefits, a panoply of 
disadvantages plague the SST exception.93 
The stated purposes of the SST exception are noble, but the 
means of effectuating these purposes raise concern. The SST 
exception presents several challenges. First, the deterrence purposes 
of the exception are not effectuated because recovery against SST 
defendants is extremely rare, and thus there is no incentive for 
potential defendants to stop alleged terror activities. Second, there is 
a significant risk of reciprocal litigation that could expose the United 
States to liability for activities affecting citizens of other countries. 
Third, there are separation-of-powers concerns associated with 
allowing the judiciary to incur on the foreign policy objectives of the 
executive branch. Finally, the SST exception tends to treat similarly 
situated plaintiffs differently depending on whether they are harmed 
by a designated state sponsor of terror or not. These disadvantages 
weaken the legal foundations of judgments entered pursuant to the 
 
 90. Id. 
 91. See Ruthann M. Deutsche, Suing State-Sponsors of Terrorism Under the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act: Giving Life to the Jurisdictional Grant After Cicippio-Puleo, 38 
INT’L LAW. 891, 891–92 (2004). See generally ORDE F. KITTRIE, LAWFARE: LAW AS A 
WEAPON OF WAR (2016) (arguing for the continued and increasing use of legal 
maneuvering as an alternative to armed conflict and military intervention in the foreign 
policy arena).  
 92. Ward, supra note 86, at 8–9. 
 93. See, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter & David Bosco, Essay, Plaintiff’s Diplomacy, 
FOREIGN AFF., Sept.–Oct. 2000, at 102, 112–16; Gartenstein-Ross, supra note 35, at 910–
30; Jack Goldsmith & Ryan Goodman, U.S. Civil Litigation and International Terrorism 
21–26 (Univ. of Chi. Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 26, 2002), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers2.cfm?abstract_id=312451 [https://perma.cc/64PE-EG97 (staff-
uploaded archive)] (offering a balanced view of the costs and benefits of permitting civil 
actions against international terrorist (state and non-state) defendants).  
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exception, and may prove to be useful tools to justify restructuring 
such judgments if the President deems such action necessary. 
2.  Failure to Deter 
The difficulty associated with actually recovering the massive 
judgments awarded to terror victims mitigates the deterrence goals of 
the amendment.94 Despite Congress’s dogged efforts to help SST 
plaintiffs,95 recovery remains extremely difficult.96 The Victims of 
Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 embodied a 
compromise between the executive branch and Congress that 
required the Treasury to pay damages out of its accounts for certain 
specified plaintiffs.97 This compromise signals the important role that 
frozen assets play for the executive branch as it attempts to negotiate 
with belligerent regimes. However, the Clinton administration was 
unwilling to relinquish control over these assets because they would 
be useful for future negotiations. President Clinton’s invocation of the 
waiver option built in to the FSIA98 ensured plaintiffs could not attach 
domestic frozen assets belonging to judgment debtors.99 During 
negotiations with Iran, the frozen assets that President Clinton 
protected constituted a bargaining chip for negotiators, and they were 
key to bringing Iran to the negotiating table.100 
Despite this positive outcome for the executive branch, the 2000 
compromise circumvented the deterrence purpose of the SST 
exception because SST defendants were not required to pay anything 
 
 94. See Baletsa, supra note 84, at 1291–99 (noting that the deterrent effect of the 
exception is mitigated by the various obstacles to recovery of judgments). 
 95. See supra Section I.C.1. 
 96. Aryeh S. Portnoy et al., Crowell & Moring LLP, The Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act: 2012 Year in Review, 20 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 565, 604 (2014) (detailing 
the various challenges to recovery); see also ELSEA, supra note 55, at 69–74 (providing a 
breakdown on which plaintiffs have been paid, by whom, and how much they have been 
paid); Barry E. Carter, Terrorism Supported by Rogue States: Some Foreign Policy 
Questions Created by Involving U.S. Courts, 36 NEW ENG. L. REV. 933, 937 (2002) (noting 
that countries designated as SSTs have little incentive to cooperate with the judgments, 
and that most countries at risk of running afoul of the U.S. government have learned to 
keep very little money in U.S. bank accounts because of the risk of attachment).  
 97. See ELSEA, supra note 55, at 12; see also JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., RS22094, LAWSUITS AGAINST STATE SUPPORTERS OF TERRORISM: AN 
OVERVIEW 3 (2005). 
 98. See supra Section I.C.1. 
 99. Kim, supra note 33, at 520. 
 100. See Rob Garver, Here’s What’s in Iran’s $100 Billion in Assets That Will Become 
Unfrozen by the Nuclear Deal, BUS. INSIDER (July 14, 2015, 7:20 PM), http://www
.businessinsider.com/whats-in-irans-100-billion-in-frozen-assets-2015-7 [https://perma.cc/BSZ9-
QYQV]. 
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at all. This problem was exacerbated further with the passage of the 
Justice for United States Victims of State Sponsored Terrorism Act in 
2015, which requires the United States to pay the victims of state-
sponsored terror, rather than forcing the judgment debtors to pay.101 
The inability to recover judgments from SST defendants presents a 
serious problem for the exception: if the purpose of the SST 
exception is deterrence, failure to recover judgments eviscerates the 
very purpose of the law, leading one to ask whether the SST 
exception creates more trouble than it is worth.102 
3.  Risk of Reciprocal Litigation 
At the time of the amendment, the State Department and the 
Department of Justice warned of the risk of reciprocal litigation, 
retaliatory litigation, and unwise judicial precedent that could stem 
from the amendment.103 The fear of reciprocal litigation is borne out 
of legitimate concerns. If holding state sponsors of terror accountable 
through the use of civil judgments is a successful means of deterring 
terrorism, there is no logical or legal path toward denying foreign 
powers the use of similar legislation to drag the U.S. government into 
foreign courts to face liability for violence perpetrated against foreign 
civilians by the United States.104 This concern is particularly acute for 
the United States because of its unprecedented international financial 
exposure—the United States is a perennial target for this sort of 
litigation. 
The risk of retaliatory litigation became a reality when Iran 
responded to the passage of the Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act 
of 2000 (“JVTA”).105 Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, a counter-terrorism 
scholar and analyst notes: 
 
 101. See supra text accompanying notes 79–81. 
 102. See Gartenstein-Ross, supra note 35, at 931–33; see also Ward, supra note 86, at 
12–13 (exposing deterrence failures). 
 103. See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: Hearing on S. 825 Before the Subcomm. on 
Courts & Admin. Practice of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 8–15 (1994) 
(statements of Stuart Schiffer, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Civil Division, and Jamison S. 
Borek, Deputy Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State); Thomas W. Lippman, Panels 
Lift Immunity in Terrorism; Proposals Open Nations to Lawsuits by Victims, WASH. POST, 
July 3, 1995, at A10 (“We are on record as having a problem with this kind of thing	.	.	.	. It 
doesn’t solve the problems it’s supposed to solve, and it just creates foreign relations 
problems.” (quoting Jamison Borek)).  
 104. See Gartenstein-Ross, supra note 35, at 917–18. 
 105. Note that the original Senate bill was called the JVTA, Justice for Victims of 
Terrorism Act, S. 1796, 106th Cong. (1999) (introduced October 26, 1999), but the name 
changed later on. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 
106-386, §	2002, 114 Stat. 1464, 1541–43 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§	1606, 1610 
note (2012)); see also Gartenstein-Ross, supra note 35, at 935–38 (describing the JVTA in 
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Shortly after the U.S. government announced that it would 
distribute around $213 million to the families of victims of 
Iranian-backed terrorism, Iran’s proreform parliament passed a 
bill that “will allow lawsuits in Iranian courts by ‘any victims of 
US [interference]	.	.	.	.’	” The bill’s passage was accompanied by 
cries of “Down with America!” The potential for retaliatory 
legislation may be particularly high because other countries 
often look to the FSIA’s standards, as a matter of reciprocity, in 
determining the extent to which they will allow lawsuits against 
the United States.106 
Examples of legislation allowing for reciprocal litigation against the 
United States have been documented in a range of other countries as 
well—from Sudan to Libya to Cuba.107 In addition, the SST exception 
 
greater detail); Sean K. Mangan, Note, Compensation for “Certain” Victims of Terrorism 
Under Section 2002 of the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000: 
Individual Payments at an Institutional Cost, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 1037, 1039–40 (2002) 
(critiquing §	2002 of the Act). 
 106. See Gartenstein-Ross, supra note 35, at 918 (alteration in original) (footnotes 
omitted) (quoting Iran MPs Cry “Down with America,” Approve Lawsuits Against United 
States, AGENCE FR. PRESSE, Nov. 1, 2000, LEXIS, News Library).  
 107. Ward, supra note 86, at 16 (detailing reciprocal litigation from Cuban litigants); 
see also LAW LIBRARY OF CONG., LAWS LIFTING SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN SELECTED 
COUNTRIES 1–16 (2016), https://www.loc.gov/law/help/sovereign-immunity/lifting-
sovereign-immunity.pdf [https://perma.cc/6DC4-YRT9] (documenting various retaliatory 
laws passed in Cuba, Iran, Libya, Russia, Sudan, and Syria as well as accompanying 
litigation). A single complaint filed in Cuba demanded approximately $170 billion against 
the United States for damages associated with the loss of Cuban lives at the hands of the 
U.S. government. Demanda del Pueblo de Cuba al Gobierno de Estados Unidos por Daños 
Humanos [Complaint of the People of Cuba Against the United States Government for 
Human Damages], PORTAL CUBA (May 31, 1999), http://www.cuba.cu/gobierno
/DEMANDA.html [https://perma.cc/ZE3N-ELWL]. In 2003, a Tehran court awarded a 
half-billion dollar judgment to an Iranian businessman who had been abducted by 
American agents while visiting the Bahamas. LAW LIBRARY OF CONG., supra, at 8. This 
judgment was levied pursuant to an Iranian law passed in the late 1980s, and the court 
rejected a plea to attach the now defunct U.S. embassy in Tehran. Id. More recently, the 
Iranian government has responded with more retaliatory legislation in light of increased 
SST judgments. Marina Alshalan, تياکش ناريا زا اکيرمٓا  اکيرمٓا یعس درک زا قيرط ماکحا یياضق یياراد 
ناريا ار هرداصم دنک. [Iran’s Grievance Against the United States Attempts by Court Order to 
Confiscate Iranian Assets.], SPUTNIK (May 16, 2016), http://ir.sputniknews.com/iran
/20160516/1500555.html [https://perma.cc/V82L-M9K7] (in Farsi); سلجم یاروش یملاسا: تلود دياب 
زا اکيرمآ تراسخ دھاوخب [Parliament: Government Must Demand Damages from the United 
States], RFI (May 17, 2016), http://fa.rfi.fr/سلجم-یاروش-یملاسا-تلود-دياب-زا-اکيرمٓا-تراسخ-دھاوخب-
20160517/ناريا[https://perma.cc/F5H3-JNCW] (in Farsi); یار عطاق سلجم یاروش یملاسا هب ود 
تيروف حرط ذخا تمارغ زا اکيرما [Islamic Consultative Assembly of Iran Passes Urgent Outline of 
Bill to Demand Damages from United States], ROOBAHNEWS.COM (May 15, 2016), http://
www.roobahnews.com/index.php/component/content/article/74-latest-news/16916-1395-02-
26-10-35-35 [https://perma.cc/Y6KV-XR9W (staff-uploaded archive)] (in Farsi); ضارتعا ديدش 
ترازو روما هجراخ ناريا هب یارآ هاگدادیاھ اکيرمآ/ ريفس سيئوس هدناوخارف دش [Iranian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs’ Strong Protest Against U.S. Court Judgments], TASNIMNEWS.COM (Apr. 26, 
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has resulted in litigation in the International Court of Justice—where 
Iran has alleged violations of an international treaty.108 
The question is simple: If the United States were levied with an 
astronomical civil judgment adjudicated by a legitimate justice system 
for the deaths of civilians in, say, Syria at the hands of an American 
supported rebel group, would the United States pay up? To ask is to 
answer.109 The more difficult question is whether the United States 
would be entitled to any colorable legal argument for not cooperating 
with such a judgment. Such an argument would be difficult to make 
considering the United States’ role in developing the very legal 




هب-یارآ-هاگداد-یاھ-اکيرمآ  [https://perma.cc/F6ZB-URTY] (in Farsi).  
 108. Press Release, Int’l Court of Justice, Iran Institutes Proceedings Against the 
United States with Regard to a Dispute Concerning Alleged Violations of the 1955 Treaty 
of Amity 1–3 (June 15, 2016), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/164/19032.pdf [https://
perma.cc/CT39-VDAS]. For an in-depth analysis of the merits of these allegations, see 
Elena Chachko, Iran Sues the U.S. in the ICJ—Preliminary Thoughts, LAWFARE (June 18, 
2016, 8:09 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/iran-sues-us-icj-–-preliminary-thoughts 
[https://perma.cc/JLP4-ZW4H]. 
 109. The United States is aware of only three cases where foreign courts in countries 
designated as SSTs have levied judgments against the United States. The Congressional 
Research Service provided a report to Congress detailing these cases. ELSEA, supra note 
55, at 66–67. Beyond these cases, there are no others on point, which may signal the 
inability of plaintiffs to bring such suits against the United States. Notably, however, the 
United States does have a history of reaching settlement agreements when it is undeniable 
that the United States committed a wrong. A clear example occurred when the United 
States agreed to compensate the families of those killed when the USS Vincennes shot 
Iran Air Flight 655 (a passenger flight) out of the air over the Persian Gulf in 1988. See 
Settlement Agreement on the Case Concerning the Aerial Incident of 3 July 1988 Before 
the International Court of Justice, Iran-U.S., ¶¶	1–11, Feb. 9, 1996, Iran-U.S., 35 I.L.M. 
572, 572–74. There are examples of covert, informal compensation practices as well, 
especially following the increase in high-profile civilian deaths as a result of drone strikes. 
See Lesley Wexler & Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Designing Amends for Lawful Civilian 
Casualties, 42 YALE J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 139–48) (on file with the 
North Carolina Law Review). 
 110. At the heart of this reality is the immensely complicated doctrine of comity. 
Comity, at its core, demands deference in the forum state to the laws of foreign sovereigns 
insofar as the foreign sovereign would enforce reciprocal laws if the parties to the case 
were inverted. See Joel R. Paul, Comity in International Law, 32 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 8–9 
(1991). These very concerns were voiced by constitutional law scholars and foreign policy 
experts at a hearing on the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act prior to its passage, 
a law that is similar in form but differs in substance from the SST exception. See Justice 
Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act: Hearing on H.R. 2040 Before the Subcomm. on the 
Constitution & Civil Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 16–22, 60–71 
(2016) (statements of Anne W. Patterson, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern 
Affairs, U.S. Department of State, and Paul B. Stephan, Professor, University of Virginia 
School of Law).  
95 N.C. L. REV. 795 (2017) 
816 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95 
4.  Separation-of-Powers Concerns 
Another common critique of the exception is that it intrudes 
upon constitutional separation-of-powers principles. The SST 
exception perpetually places the interests of private plaintiffs and 
judgments granted by the judiciary at odds with the interests of the 
executive branch in its fulfillment of foreign policy objectives.111 
Traditionally, an inherent power within the purview of the executive 
branch has been the power to dictate U.S. diplomacy, and more 
recently, the power to make policy decisions about how to fight 
terrorism. The President’s inherent power to direct U.S. diplomacy 
efforts flows from his constitutional role as commander in chief.112 
The President’s power over matters such as recognition of a foreign 
state’s sovereignty is exclusive and conclusive, and thus solely within 
the ambit of the executive branch.113 
Various commentators have noted the problematic nature of the 
SST exception because of its incursion into areas that are exclusively 
within the President’s bailiwick.114 To be sure, Congress maintains the 
right to pass laws governing foreign policy.115 However, the SST 
exception places this power into the hands of the judiciary, where 
lawyers have the opportunity to act as “private secretar[ies] of 
state.”116 This allows private citizens to choose when and how to 
engage state sponsors of terror, which creates myriad complications 
for the executive branch as it navigates the precarious waters of 
international affairs. This activity incurs directly upon the familiar 
 
 111. This reality has been borne out repeatedly in cases where the State Department 
has supported the positions of state sponsors of terror in order to ensure that the United 
States does not violate certain international conventions and legal norms. See Baletsa, 
supra note 84, at 1292–93 (noting that following the decision in Flatow v. Iran, Flatow 
sought to enforce his judgment against Iran by attaching an old embassy building, at which 
point government attorneys successfully intervened to ensure that the United States 
complied with Article 22(3) of the Vienna Convention, and to avoid the seizure of 
American embassies in other countries); see also Ward, supra note 86, at 11 (citing Robert 
Schmidt, U.S. Man Suing Iran Finds State Dep’t His Foe: Bid to Collect Assets Collides with 
Foreign Policy Concerns, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 10, 1998, at 1, 6).  
 112. U.S. CONST. art. II. 
 113. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2096 (2015). 
 114. See Ward, supra note 86, at 13–14 (arguing that when the President participates in 
waiving SST exception attachment proceedings, he concedes power by participating in 
congressional self-aggrandizement in the arena of foreign policy). See generally Kim, supra 
note 33 (detailing the various separation-of-powers concerns implicated by the SST 
exception). 
 115. Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2096 (“[T]he Court does not question the substantial 
powers of Congress over foreign affrairs in general	.	.	.	.”). 
 116. Kim, supra note 33, at 525 (alteration in original).  
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notion that the nation must “speak	.	.	.	with one voice” in regard to 
certain foreign policy matters.117 
In a recent separation-of-powers decision, Zivotofsky v. Kerry,118 
the Supreme Court relied heavily on the “one voice” doctrine to find 
that the President has the exclusive and conclusive power to 
recognize the legitimacy of foreign sovereigns.119 Although the Court 
conceded that “[t]he Executive is not free from the ordinary controls 
and checks of Congress merely because foreign affairs are at issue[,]” 
the Court found that recognizing the legitimacy of a foreign state 
requires unitary decision making that is best left for the President 
alone.120 Zivotofsky took a functionalist approach121 to the inherent 
authority of the President.122 
Under a functionalist approach, a key consideration is whether 
the activity in question is one that requires characteristics such as 
unity, “[d]ecision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch.”123 The Zivotofksy 
Court noted that “[t]he President is capable, in ways Congress is not, 
of engaging in the delicate and often secret diplomatic contacts that 
may lead to a decision on recognition.	.	.	.	[and] is also better 
positioned to take the decisive, unequivocal action necessary to 
recognize other states at international law.”124 Much like the decision 
about whether to recognize a foreign sovereign, decisions about when 
and how to hold foreign sovereigns accountable for terrorist activities 
often require unequivocal and consistent action on behalf of the 
United States. In other words, these activities require the nation to 
“speak	.	.	.	with one voice.”125 
The SST exception, however, results in a nation speaking 
through thousands of voices in the form of plaintiffs, lawyers, and 
federal judges. The disparate, disjointed, disorderly cacophony that 
 
 117. Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 424 (2003). 
 118. 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015). 
 119. Id. at 2086. But see id. at 2123 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“In the end, the Court’s 
decision does not rest on text or history or precedent. It instead comes down to ‘functional 
considerations’—principally the Court’s perception that the Nation ‘must speak with one 
voice’ about the status of Jerusalem.” (quoting majority opinion). 
 120. Id. at 2090 (majority opinion). 
 121. Functionalism, as opposed to formalism, requires a court to consider 
“constitutional policy and practice” when determining where power should be allocated 
among the branches of government. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Relationships Between 
Formalism and Functionalism in Separation of Powers Cases, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
21, 21 (1998). 
 122. Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2086. 
 123. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 424 (Alexander 
Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)). 
 124. Id. at 2086 (citations omitted). 
 125. Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 424 (2003). 
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emerges from SST litigation makes it difficult for the President’s 
position to be heard loud and clear from oceans away. From this 
abstract constitutional struggle flow the practical obstacles the 
President must resolve. 
The other side of the constitutional coin is equally troublesome. 
It is the sole duty of Congress to determine the subject matter 
jurisdiction of Article III courts.126 However, the SST exception 
delegates designation power to the Secretary of State, an arm of the 
executive branch.127 Therefore, the executive branch, rather than 
Congress, dictates the jurisdiction of the federal courts in this area, 
raising the specter of “an unconstitutional delegation of core 
legislative power.”128 This issue was raised in Rein v. Socialist People’s 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,129 but was ultimately left unresolved.130 The 
Rein court concluded that Libya lacked standing to challenge the 
constitutionality of delegating the power to determine the jurisdiction 
of federal courts to the Secretary of State.131 In so doing, the Second 
Circuit quietly evaded the sticky constitutional issue embedded in the 
SST exception. The court explicitly reserved the possibility that the 
delegation issue might be litigated in the future if the sovereign party 
was not a designated state sponsor of terror at the time §	1605(a)(7) 
was passed.132 
 
 126. U.S. CONST. art. III, §§	1–2. 
 127. See 22 U.S.C. §	2371 (2012); 50 U.S.C. app. §	2405(j) (2012). Designations under 
these statutes are made by the Secretary of State for the purposes of regulating, 
respectively, exports and foreign aid. But since the passage of §	1605(a)(7) in 1996, the 
Secretary’s designations affect sovereign immunity as well. See 28 U.S.C. §	1605A(h)(6) 
(2012).  
 128. Rein v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 162 F.3d 748, 763 (2d Cir. 
1998). 
 129. 162 F.3d 748 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 130. In that case, families of victims of the Pan Am Flight 103 bombing sued Libya 
under the SST exception. Id. at 754–55. Libya challenged the constitutionality of Congress 
delegating the power to determine the jurisdiction of federal courts to the Secretary of 
State. Id. at 762. The Second Circuit held, in effect, that Libya did not have standing to 
challenge the constitutionality of the exception because Libya had been designated as a 
state sponsor of terror prior to the activation of the exception. Id. at 764. Therefore, there 
was no delegation of jurisdiction-creating power to begin with in Libya’s case. Id. (“[I]n 
the particular case before us there was no delegation at all. The decision to subject Libya 
to jurisdiction under §	1605(a)(7) was manifestly made by Congress itself rather than by 
the State Department. At the time that §	1605(a)(7) was passed, Libya was already on the 
list of state sponsors of terrorism. No decision whatsoever of the Secretary of State was 
needed to create jurisdiction over Libya for its alleged role in the destruction of Pan Am 
103. That jurisdiction existed the moment that the AEDPA amendment became law.”).  
 131. Id. at 764.  
 132. Id. (“The issue of delegation might be presented if another foreign sovereign—
one not identified as a state sponsor of terrorism when §	1605(a)(7) was passed—was 
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Other separation-of-powers concerns arise from efforts by 
Congress to dictate the disposition of attachment proceedings on 
behalf of SST plaintiffs, an issue recently taken up by the Supreme 
Court in Bank Markazi v. Peterson.133 As evidenced above, there are 
a variety of constitutional defects associated with the SST exception 
that weaken the foundations of judgments entered pursuant to it. 
Beyond these constitutional concerns, core questions remain about 
the fairness of the SST exception. 
5.  Inequality and Unfairness Among Similarly Situated Plaintiffs 
Another common critique of the SST exception is that it leaves 
similarly situated individuals with disparate opportunities for relief. If 
a U.S. citizen is killed or injured in a terrorist attack that is 
orchestrated or supported by a sovereign not designated as an official 
state sponsor of terror, there is no right of action in U.S. courts unless 
another exception to the FSIA applies.134 The State Department 
retains broad discretion to designate state sponsors of terror.135 The 
Secretary of State can designate any country whose government “has 
repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism” as a 
state sponsor of terror.136 In reality, designation as a state sponsor of 
terror often has very little to do with terrorism, and more to do with 
policy.137 These policy decisions can result in substantial unfairness 
 
placed on the relevant list by the State Department and, on being sued in federal court, 
interposed the defense that Libya now raises.”). 
 133. 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1316–17 (2016) (holding that Congress could constitutionally 
direct the outcome of pending litigation by passing a law effectively disposing of Iranian 
assets in favor of SST plaintiffs). 
 134. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§	1330, 1602, 1605–1607 (2015) (discussing the purpose of the 
FSIA, and characterizing a determination that a foreign sovereign lacks immunity as an 
“exception” to the general rule that foreign sovereigns are immune); Justice Against 
Sponsors of Terrorism Act, Pub. L. No. 144-222, §	3, 130 Stat. 852, 853 (2016) (codified at 
28 U.S.C. §	1605B). 
 135. Id. §	1605A(h)(6) (“[T]he term ‘state sponsor of terrorism’ means a country the 
government of which the Secretary of State has determined, for purposes of section 6(j) of 
the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2405(j)), section 620A of the 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371), section 40 of the Arms Export Control 
Act (22 U.S.C. 2780), or any other provision of law, is a government that has repeatedly 
provided support for acts of international terrorism	.	.	.	.”). 
 136. Id. Of course, if the state actor is deemed a state sponsor of terror as a result of 
the event, liability could attach retroactively pursuant to the FSIA. Id. 
§	1605A(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). 
 137. See COOPER-HILL, supra note 33, at 189 (“[F]or reasons both political and 
economic, [some] countries have never been placed on the list [of designated state 
sponsors of terror]”); Keith Sealing, “State Sponsors of Terrorism” Is a Question, Not an 
Answer: The Terrorism Amendment to the FSIA Makes Less Sense Now Than It Did 
Before 9/11, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 119, 138–41 (2003) (arguing that various other states should 
95 N.C. L. REV. 795 (2017) 
820 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95 
among similarly situated parties. One example of this inherent 
unfairness is especially stark. 
Following the attacks at the World Trade Center in New York 
City on September 11th, 2001, plaintiffs who were injured or lost 
loved ones brought suit in the Southern District of New York against 
hundreds of defendants allegedly involved in the attacks. One of 
these defendants was Saudi Arabia.138 The complaint submitted 
against Saudi Arabia set forth a range of allegations detailing 
significant ties between the House of Saud, Saudi princes, Saudi 
charities, and Al-Qaeda.139 Saudi Arabia was dismissed from the 
lawsuit by the district court judge in 2008, despite no factual 
investigation or determination about Saudi Arabia’s alleged role in 
9/11.140 The judge found that Saudi Arabia’s sovereign immunity 
could not be pierced because it was not a designated state sponsor of 
terror.141 Because none of the designated state sponsors of terror142 
could be conclusively connected to the 9/11 attacks, many plaintiffs 
from those attacks were unable to collect from anyone at all.143 On the 
other hand, victims of other terrorist attacks are awarded massive 
judgments merely because the alleged supporting state of the 
terrorism is or was at one time a designated state sponsor of terror.144 
Notably, Congress has taken steps to correct this inequity and to 
remove any executive determinations regarding sovereign immunity. 
Fifteen years after 9/11, Congress attempted to correct this unfairness 
by passing the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (“JASTA”) 
in defiance of President Obama’s veto of the legislation.145 The law 
 
be designated state sponsors of terror, including Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and 
Somalia); see also Dennis Jett, Why the State Sponsors of Terrorism List Has So Little To 
Do with Terrorism, HUFFINGTON POST (June 29, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com
/dennis-jett/state-sponsors-of-terrorism-list_b_7658880.html [https://perma.cc/E6YX-ZZYK].  
 138. In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 538 F.3d 71, 75 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 139. Id. at 76–79. 
 140. See id. at 78. 
 141. Id. (noting that none of the other exceptions to the FSIA applied). 
 142. Currently, Iran, Sudan, and Syria are listed as state sponsors of terrorism. State 
Sponsors of Terrorism, U.S. DEP’T STATE, http://www.state.gov/j/ct/list/c14151.htm 
[https://perma.cc/7R6Y-PCH6]. In 2004, the list was much longer, with Sudan, Cuba, Iran, 
Iraq, North Korea, Syria, and Libya all making the cut. Kim, supra note 33, at 523.  
 143. Kim, supra note 33, at 523–24. But see infra Section III.A. (arguing that precisely 
because these plaintiffs were unable to collect against Saudi Arabia, some of them brought 
suit against Iran, even though the evidence supporting the contention that Iran was 
involved in the 9/11 attacks is scant). 
 144. See, e.g., Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 6, 25–34 (D.D.C. 
1998). 
 145. See Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, Pub. L. No. 114-222, §	3, 130 Stat. 
852, 853 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §	1605B); Message to the Senate Returning Without 
Approval the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, 2016 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 
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creates a cause of action against any foreign state for causing harm to 
Americans through an international act of terrorism.146 However, 
collecting under the new statute will be excessively difficult because 
traditional enforcement and collection mechanisms available under 
§	1605A (the SST exception) of the FSIA are not available to 
claimants who fall under the JASTA exception.147 President Obama 
argued vehemently against the bill and vetoed its passage (a veto that 
was ultimately overridden).148 Ironically, in his veto message, 
President Obama justified the veto by emphasizing many of the 
disadvantages discussed in this Part—disadvantages shared by the 
SST exception and JASTA.149 Soon after passing the law, members of 
Congress expressed a sense of buyer’s remorse as they comprehended 
the unintended consequences of the law. Senators Lindsey Graham 
and John McCain have already discussed legislation that would 
narrow the scope of the law in order to avoid the risk of retaliatory 
litigation, while commentators have proposed fixing the law by 
including a presidential waiver provision.150 Because of these 
challenges, a remedy to the unfairness of the SST exception remains 
elusive. 
 
1–3 (Sept. 23, 2016) [hereinafter President Obama Veto Message] (President Obama 
voicing his reasons for the veto). 
 146. Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act §	3. 
 147. For instance, JASTA claimants cannot take advantage of § 1610(a)(7) and (b)(2), 
which provide the enforcement mechanisms available to claimants under the traditional 
SST exception. Ingrid Wuerth, Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act: Initial Analysis, 
LAWFARE (Sept. 29, 2016, 2:19 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/justice-against-
sponsors-terrorism-act-initial-analysis [https://perma.cc/EDR8-DEW3].  
 148. President Obama Veto Message, supra note 145. 
 149. Id. at 2–3 (“JASTA threatens to reduce the effectiveness of our response to 
indications that a foreign government has taken steps outside our borders to provide 
support for terrorism, by taking such matters out of the hands of national security and 
foreign policy professionals and placing them in the hands of private litigants and 
courts	.	.	.	. Enactment of JASTA could encourage foreign governments to act reciprocally 
and allow their domestic courts to exercise jurisdiction over the United States or U.S. 
officials—including our men and women in uniform—for allegedly causing injuries 
overseas via U.S. support to third parties.”).  
 150. See John Bellinger, How Congress Could Fix JASTA: Give the President Waiver 
Authority, LAWFARE (Oct. 5, 2016, 8:40 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/how-congress-
could-fix-jasta-give-president-waiver-authority [https://perma.cc/23ZE-V95T]; Marcy 
Kreiter, JASTA: Congress May Be Experiencing Buyer’s Remorse over Sept. 11 Bill; 
Lawmakers May Address the Issue Again in November, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Sept. 29, 2016, 
4:59 PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/jasta-congress-may-be-experiencing-buyers-remorse-
over-sept-11-bill-lawmakers-may-2424212 [https://perma.cc/26VV-LBR3]; Austin Wright, 
Graham, McCain Unveil ‘Fix’ to 9/11 Saudi Law, POLITICO (Nov. 30, 2016, 5:48 PM), 
http://www.politico.com/story/2016/11/graham-mccain-saudi-arabia-911-232026 [https://perma
.cc/B4ZC-ZP97].  
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Beyond the inherent unfairness of allowing for recovery against 
some countries and not others, the arbitrariness of designation 
decisions is also a looming concern. For instance, although many 
would view North Korea as a pariah state because of its nuclear 
program and aggressive tactics, North Korea is no longer a designated 
state sponsor of terror.151 This example alone provides valuable 
insight as to why many view the designation decisions to be arbitrary 
and contradictory. Designation as a state sponsor of terror can be 
used as a stick, and the prospect of removal from the list can be used 
as a carrot. This foreign policy strategy might be acceptable if it were 
simply used to designate pariah states, but when the designation 
interacts with the SST exception, arbitrary results occur. 
Furthermore, designation as a state sponsor of terror tends to 
engender hostility towards the United States, and may diminish 
respect for the rule of law within the international community.152 
There is also evidence to suggest that there is an implicit bias among 
judges when considering the lawsuits brought under the SST 
exception—it is exceedingly difficult to remain impartial when one 
party is an American citizen and another party is a foreign state 
designated as a state sponsor of terror.153 
 
 151. State Sponsors of Terrorism, supra note 142; see also Kim, supra note 33, at 523 
(noting that North Korea was once on the list). 
 152. Gartenstein-Ross, supra note 35, at 919–21 (noting that the hypocrisy of the 
exception engenders direct hostility and “erodes [the] credibility [of the United States] on 
jurisprudential matters”). 
 153. The dicta in D.C. District Court Judge Royce Lamberth’s opinions demonstrate 
this point. See Estate of Bland v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 831 F. Supp. 2d 150, 158 
(D.D.C. 2011) (“In closing, the Court appreciates plaintiffs’ selfless sacrifice and their 
persistent efforts to hold Iran and MOIS accountable for their support of terrorism. The 
Court concludes that defendants Iran and MOIS must be punished to the fullest extent 
legally possible for the bombing in Beirut on October 23, 1983. This horrific act impacted 
countless individuals and their families, nearly one hundred of whom are parties to this 
lawsuit. This Court hopes that the victims and their families may find some measure of 
solace from this Court’s final judgment.”); Murphy v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 740 F. 
Supp. 2d 51, 83 (D.D.C. 2010) (“Iran and MOIS are responsible for the deaths and injuries 
of hundreds of American servicemen; are liable for physical, emotional, and pecuniary 
injuries suffered as a result; and deserve to be punished to the fullest legal extent possible. 
In a recent interview, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad declared that he and his 
country ‘oppose terrorism. We strongly oppose’ it. The Court sincerely hopes that the 
compensatory damages awarded today help to alleviate plaintiffs’ and intervenors’ 
injuries, and that the punitive damages also awarded inspire Iran to adhere to its professed 
opposition to terrorism.” (quoting Interview by George Stephanopoulos, Chief Political 
Correspondent, ABC News, with Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, President, Iran (May 5, 2010), 
http://abcnews.go.com/print?id=10558442 [https://perma.cc/U9ST-LJG9])); Valore v. 
Islamic Republic of Iran, 700 F. Supp. 2d 52, 90 (D.D.C. 2010) (“Iran and MOIS are 
responsible for the deaths and injuries of hundreds of American servicemen, are liable for 
the emotional injuries their family members have suffered as a result, and deserve to be 
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As discussed above, the SST exception to the FSIA has been 
debated since its inception.154 There are significant disputes about 
whether the exception is wise, valid, useful, and, most importantly, 
constitutional in its current form.155 The SST exception is plagued by 
controversy; it impedes executive foreign policy objectives and 
requires constant tweaking to ensure recovery is possible.156 These 
realities establish fertile soil for a President who may seek to alter, 
amend, renegotiate, or restructure judgments entered under the 
exception—especially when key foreign policy goals hang in the 
balance. Although the constitutionality of the SST exception has 
never been challenged,157 such a challenge may become plausible if 
the exception continues to be exposed as a serious obstacle to the 
executive branch in its resolution of foreign policy matters.158 
II.  OBSTACLES TO IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ACCORD CREATED BY 
STATE-SPONSORED TERROR JUDGMENTS AGAINST IRAN 
The judgments against Iran are a substantial obstacle to the 
normalization of relations between Iran and the United States. More 
specifically, these judgments create a genuine risk that the Accord 
will fail. As discussed in Part I, the United States has invested 
monumental sums of political, financial, and diplomatic capital to 
ensure the Accord’s success. Allowing the foreign policy objectives of 
 
punished to the fullest legal extent possible. World-renowned Iranian poet Simin 
Behbahani	.	.	.	recently implored her nation to ‘Stop this screaming, mayhem, and 
bloodshed. Stop doing what makes God’s creatures mourn with tears.’ The Court sincerely 
hopes that the compensatory damages awarded today help to alleviate plaintiffs’ physical, 
emotional, and financial injury and that the punitive damages also awarded inspire Iran to 
heed Ms. Behbahani’s words.” (quoting Mark Memmott, Poet Simin Behbahani: Neda Is 
‘Voice of the People of Iran’, NPR (June 26, 2009, 4:30 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections
/thetwo-way/2009/06/poet_simin_behbahani_says_neda.html [https://perma.cc/RHF9-S353])).  
 154. See supra text accompanying notes 91–93. 
 155. See generally, e.g., Baletsa, supra note 84 (challenging the validity of AEDPA’s 
withdrawal of sovereign immunity because of the inability of private suits to effectuate 
their stated purpose of combatting state-sponsored terrorism); Gartenstein-Ross, supra 
note 35 (arguing that, in the wake of 9/11, only the political branches should engage in 
combatting terrorism through military and diplomatic powers, not politically 
unaccountable actors through the terrorism exception to the FSIA); Kim, supra note 33 
(exploring the tendency of the SST exception to undermine the executive branch’s ability 
to fight terrorism and how constitutional separation-of-powers problems potentially arise). 
 156. Kim, supra note 33, at 519–21 (discussing the struggle between the executive 
branch and Congress over recovery of foreign frozen assets pursuant to the amendments). 
 157. But see Rein v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 162 F.3d 748, 762–64 
(2d Cir. 1998) (challenging the constitutionality of the delegation of jurisdiction decisions 
to the executive branch, but not challenging the SST exception more generally). 
 158. Of course, the political question doctrine is a pesky impediment to such 
challenges. 
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the President to falter because of these judgments would be a 
regrettable mistake, a mistake that might result in a military 
confrontation between two of the world’s most polarized countries. 
This Part begins by briefly exploring the nature of the judgments 
pending against Iran, and then discusses the various diplomatic 
obstacles posed by these judgments. First, the judgments impede 
normalization efforts. Second, the judgments simultaneously inhibit 
Iranian integration into the international economy and stunt the 
infiltration of American soft power. Third, the judgments pose 
political challenges for the President because of their emotional and 
political appeal. Finally, the judgments place American businesses 
seeking opportunity in Iran at a disadvantage. The executive branch 
and Iran can avoid these downfalls by skillfully resolving these 
judgments.159 
A. The Judgments Against Iran 
Although there are judgments pending against a number of SST 
defendants, Iran leads the way in pending judgments.160 As of August 
2015, total damages assessed by U.S. courts against Iran are estimated 
to exceed $46 billion, arising from more than eighty-five reported 
decisions—these numbers continue to grow.161 These judgments arise 
from a number of incidents: over $9.6 billion for attacks on U.S. 
embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi in 1998,162 more than $9.5 
billion for attacks on the U.S. embassy in Beirut in 1983 and 1984,163 
 
 159. See infra Part IV. 
 160. ELSEA, supra note 55, at 69–74. As of 2008, Libya was a distant second in terms of 
total damages assessed against it, owing approximately $1.6 billion. Id. at 75. Other 
countries still owing damages as of 2008 included Sudan, Iraq, and Cuba. Id. Many of 
these damages have been settled since that time. See, e.g., Libyan Claims Resolution Act, 
Pub. L. No. 110-301, §§	3–5, 122 Stat. 2999, 2999–3002 (2008) (codified as amended at 28 
U.S.C. §	1605A note (2012)) (settling claims against Libya and removing Libya from the 
state sponsor of terror list).  
 161. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., TERRORISM JUDGMENTS AGAINST IRAN 4, https://
www.kirk.senate.gov/pdfs/AmericanIranianJudgments.pdf [https://perma.cc/56K2-S5JW]; 
see also, e.g., In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, No. 03-MDL-1570, 2016 WL 
1029552, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2016) (awarding over $10 billion against Iran).  
 162. See, e.g., Owens v. Republic of Sudan, 71 F. Supp. 3d 252, 256 (D.D.C. 2014) ($622 
million); Amduso v. Republic of Sudan, 61 F. Supp. 3d 42, 46 (D.D.C. 2014) ($1.7 billion); 
Onsongo v. Republic of Sudan, 60 F. Supp. 3d 144, 148 (D.D.C. 2014) ($199 million); 
Opati v. Republic of Sudan, 60 F. Supp. 3d 68, 76 (D.D.C. 2014) ($3.1 billion); Wamai v. 
Republic of Sudan, 60 F. Supp. 3d 84, 89 (D.D.C. 2014) ($3.5 billion); Mwila v. Islamic 
Republic of Iran, 33 F. Supp. 3d 36, 40 (D.D.C. 2014) ($419 million). 
 163. See, e.g., Estate of Doe v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 943 F. Supp. 2d 180, 184 
(D.D.C. 2013) ($8.4 billion); Brewer v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 664 F. Supp. 2d 43, 57–59 
(D.D.C. 2009) ($309.5 million); Welch v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 1:01-CV-00863, 
2007 WL 7688043, at *35 (D.D.C. Sept. 20, 2007) ($32.7 million); Dammarell v. Islamic 
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over $7 billion for the 9/11 attacks,164 and over $9 billion for attacks 
on Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983.165 In almost every case that has 
been brought against Iran, Iran has chosen not to show up in court 
and thus defaulted.166 Many speculate that Iran has defaulted because 
it does not recognize the jurisdiction of the United States over these 
suits as legitimate, while others speculate that the difficulty of 
collecting on SST judgments creates little incentive for Iran to show 
up and defend itself in U.S. courthouses.167 
The stories of victims killed by these terrorist attacks are horrific. 
Most were killed or injured in terrorist attacks in Israel, Lebanon, and 
other countries. Groups supported by Iran, such as Hamas or 
Hezbollah, carried out many of the attacks. A sampling of cases 
reveals the varying nature of these attacks: Judith Greenbaum died in 
a bombing caused by Hamas,168 Alisa Flatow was killed when her bus 
collided with a van full of explosives in Israel,169 Yekutiel “Tuly” 
 
Republic of Iran, No. 1:01-02224, 2006 WL 2583043, at *1 (D.D.C. Sept. 7, 2006) ($316.92 
million); Salazar v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 370 F. Supp. 2d 105, 117 (D.D.C. 2005) ($18.3 
million); Wagner v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 172 F. Supp. 2d 128, 138 (D.D.C. 2001) 
($316.28 million). 
 164. See, e.g., In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, No. 03-MDL-1570, 2012 
WL 4711407, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2012) ($6.05 billion).  
 165. See, e.g., Spencer v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 71 F. Supp. 3d 23, 31 (D.D.C. 2014) 
($453.6 million); Taylor v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 881 F. Supp. 2d 19, 25 (D.D.C. 2012) 
($657.12 million); Fain v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 885 F. Supp. 2d 78, 84 (D.D.C. 2012) 
($67.79 million); Estate of Brown v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 872 F. Supp. 2d 37, 45–46 
(D.D.C. 2012) ($813.77 million) (“Iran is racking up quite a bill from its sponsorship of 
terrorism. After this opinion, this Court will have issued over $8.8 billion in judgments 
against Iran as a result of the 1983 Beirut bombing.”); Davis v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 
882 F. Supp. 2d 7, 17 (D.D.C. 2012) ($2.16 billion); O’Brien v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 
853 F. Supp. 2d 44, 49 (D.D.C. 2012) ($44.62 million); Anderson v. Islamic Republic of 
Iran, 839 F. Supp. 2d 263, 268 (D.D.C. 2012) ($33.3 million); Estate of Bland v. Islamic 
Republic of Iran, 831 F. Supp. 2d 150, 158 (D.D.C. 2011) ($1.23 billion); Valore v. Islamic 
Republic of Iran, 700 F. Supp. 2d 52, 84–90 (D.D.C. 2010) ($1.02 billion); Peterson v. 
Islamic Republic of Iran, 515 F. Supp. 2d 25, 60–67 (D.D.C. 2007) ($2.66 billion); Prevatt 
v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 421 F. Supp. 2d 152, 162 (D.D.C. 2006) ($2.5 million). See 
generally CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 161 (tabling pending judgments against 
Iran, complete with damage awards).  
 166. See infra Part III; see also Hoye, supra note 87, at 136 (“[A]ll but one of the cases 
filed under the Act to date have proceeded on the basis of default judgments entered 
against foreign state defendants in absentia.”). But see generally Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 
136 S. Ct. 1310 (2016) (revealing that Iran does choose to litigate under certain 
circumstances). 
 167. Hoye, supra note 87, at 136 (“Until a more broadly based group of successful 
plaintiffs are able to collect routinely on judgments awarded under the Act, without the 
extraordinary and unusual remedy of special legislation, there seems to be little incentive 
for foreign state defendants or their agents to appear, much less to defend themselves 
aggressively, in Antiterrorism Act cases.”). 
 168. Greenbaum v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 451 F. Supp. 2d 90, 96 (D.D.C. 2006). 
 169. Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 6–7 (D.D.C. 1998). 
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Wultz was wounded and his son Daniel was killed in a suicide 
bombing in Tel Aviv,170 Chapour Bakhtiar, a former Prime Minister 
of Iran, was murdered in Paris,171 and Petty Officer Robert Holland 
was killed, along with hundreds of others, in a Marine barracks 
bombing in Beirut carried out by Hezbollah.172 The list of victims 
could go on for pages, and their backgrounds are as diverse as they 
are tragic. Some of the victims were students studying abroad,173 some 
were exiled military or political leaders who previously served the 
Shah,174 and others served in the U.S. Armed Forces.175 
The victims were innocent of any wrongdoing. Although disdain 
for the United States is palpable in some regions of the Middle East, 
many of these victims were killed in regions generally considered 
safe—urban centers such as Tel Aviv, Paris, or Beirut. However, 
many of the plaintiffs seeking to hold Iran liable for these heinous 
acts of terror ask courts to take a logical leap that is not always legally 
or factually sound.176 The various shortcomings of these lawsuits, and 
especially the problems created by default judgments, are considered 
in Part III of this Comment. The remainder of this Part considers the 
role that these judgments play as obstacles to full implementation of 
the Accord. 
B. SST Judgments Impede Normalization 
Daveed Gartenstein-Ross noted the impediments to diplomatic 
normalization created by the SST exception soon after its inception.177 
 
 170. Wultz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 864 F. Supp. 2d 24, 27 (D.D.C. 2012). 
 171. Bakhtiar v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 571 F. Supp. 2d 27, 30–31 (D.D.C. 2008). 
 172. Holland v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 496 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2005); see also id. 
at 6–12 (detailing the factual findings surrounding the 1983 Beirut Marine barracks 
bombing). 
 173. Flatow, 999 F. Supp. at 7. 
 174. Oveissi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 879 F. Supp. 2d 44, 50 (D.D.C. 2012); 
Bakhtiar, 571 F. Supp. 2d at 29. 
 175. Holland, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 4. 
 176. Consider the case of Terry Anderson, an American journalist who was kidnapped 
in Beirut and kept as a hostage for nearly seven years. Anderson alleged that Iran utilized 
Hezbollah as an agent for the purposes of keeping him hostage, and was awarded 
$24,540,000 in damages. See Anderson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 90 F. Supp. 2d 107, 
108–09, 109 n.1, 114 (D.D.C. 2000). However, it was later reported that Iran had actually 
paid Hezbollah between $1 million and $2 million to release Anderson. See ELAINE 
SCIOLINO, PERSIAN MIRRORS: THE ELUSIVE FACE OF IRAN 350 (2000). It should be 
noted, however, that Schiolino framed Iran’s actions as an exercise in political 
maneuvering, not goodwill. Id. (“[A]fter the hostages had outlived their political 
usefulness and Iran was eager to improve its international standing in the aftermath of the 
Persian Gulf war, Iran reportedly paid the kidnappers between $1 million and $2 million 
for the release of each hostage.”).  
 177. Gartenstein-Ross, supra note 35, at 925–30; see also Ward, supra note 86, at 17. 
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Gartenstein-Ross’s scholarship presaged the very normalization 
challenges now posed by SST judgments. Although a state sponsor of 
terror can easily be delisted as such by the State Department, the 
judgments against the SST defendants are not as easy to eliminate.178 
This reality seriously limits the range of methods by which the 
executive branch can incentivize belligerent regimes to cooperate. 
Ironically, although the exception was created to make it easier to 
fight terrorism, the exception might actually hamper efforts to do so 
because the judgments create a cloud of apprehension over 
normalization discussions.179 The United States’ recent Accord with 
Iran illuminates this problem: although sanctions are slowly being 
lifted, SST judgments remain unresolved and provide a ready excuse 
for either party to back away from further negotiations or other 
attempts at normalization.180 This Section discusses how these 
outstanding damage awards pose a threat to normalizing relations 
with Iran. 
As part of the Accord, the United States has agreed to release a 
substantial portion of frozen Iranian assets held in American banks, 
and countries around the world will also lift sanctions against Iran.181 
Although there is significant disagreement about Iran’s immediate 
financial benefits as a result of the Accord, estimates range from $50 
billion to $150 billion, with some of the assets considered “unusable” 
because they are committed to other claims and payments.182 This is a 
 
 178. See Gartenstein-Ross, supra note 35, at 925 (finding that “once judgments are 
entered under the exception, the executive has little control over them” and emphasizing 
the reduced executive flexibility associated with SST judgments). 
 179. See id. at 928 (“The executive’s ability to swiftly normalize relations can bolster all 
of the antiterrorism techniques on which the United States has relied. The prospects of 
normalization can encourage other countries to support U.S. military operations, 
contribute to policing efforts, and participate in sanctions regimes. To the extent that the 
terrorism exception undermines this important carrot, it damages the full range of 
antiterrorist measures.”). 
 180. In fact, Curtis Bradley, Professor of Law at Duke University, formerly at the 
University of Virginia, noted this exact problem in 2002 during a telephone interview with 
Daveed Gartenstein-Ross when he highlighted the risk that these sorts of lawsuits might 
one day thwart attempts to normalize relations with countries across the world. See id. at 
920–21 (citation omitted). Professor Bradley noted in the interview that this “will be one 
issue in negotiation in the future that we have to resolve with those countries to have 
closer relations: If there are huge damage awards on the table, we would have to somehow 
resolve that.” Id. at 928.  
 181. Jessica Schulberg, Treasury: No, Iran Is Not Getting $150 Billion from the Nuclear 
Deal, HUFFINGTON POST (July 29, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/treasury-
iran-150-billion-nuclear-deal_55b8dc41e4b0224d88348e1c [https://perma.cc/BSS9-HKBS]. 
 182. See id.; see also Garver, supra note 100; Bijan Khajehpour, Will Iran Get Its 
Billions Back?, U.S. NEWS (July 30, 2015, 1:52 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles
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significant sum of money for Iran, where the GDP was $400 billion in 
2014.183 Iran has stated repeatedly that these funds will be put to good 
use to improve infrastructure, update oil production facilities, and 
jumpstart the struggling Iranian economy.184 Iran’s access to these 
funds was a key motivator and bargaining chip during negotiations, 
and Iran is likely to be hesitant to allow any depletion of these funds. 
After implementation day, which occurred on January 16, 2016, 
these funds were to be released directly to Iran.185 However, as the 
victims’ attorneys prepare to take their share of this windfall before it 
reaches Iranian banks, there is a risk that this linchpin incentive 
holding the Accord in balance may vanish.186 In fact, Ayatollah 
 
/2015/07/30/will-iran-get-its-billions-back [https://perma.cc/22A7-FM2Y]; Northam, supra 
note 25.  
 183. Northam, supra note 25. 
 184. Khajehpour, supra note 182 (“President Rouhani has instructed officials to use 
[the released funds] for infrastructure projects and to promote domestic industries. This 
decree reflects two key issues: Rouhani remaining focused on job creation as both 
infrastructure and domestic industry have strong employment effects, as well as the 
government’s desire to empower Iranian industry as it feels vulnerable to a potential 
opening of the domestic market.”). 
 185. The full results of implementation day are yet to be seen, but implementation day 
begins the process of lifting sanctions against Iran and returning blocked Iranian assets. 
See U.S. DEP’T. OF TREASURY, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE 
LIFTING OF CERTAIN U.S. SANCTIONS UNDER THE JOINT COMPREHENSIVE PLAN OF 
ACTION (JCPOA) ON IMPLEMENTATION DAY 1–2 (2016), https://www.treasury.gov
/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/jcpoa_faqs.pdf [https://perma.cc/QZ3Q-
2JTQ]; Implementation Day Statement, U.S. DEP’T. TREASURY (Jan. 16, 2016), https://www
.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/jcpoa_implementation.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/Z4FF-8M43]; The JCPOA Timeline, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD., 
http://csis.org/ppp/index.htm [https://perma.cc/THB4-DQL7 (staff-uploaded archive)].  
 186. See Rebecca Davis O’Brien, Saudi Arabia Is Dismissed as Defendant in 9/11 
Lawsuits, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 29, 2015, 10:56 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/saudi-
arabia-is-dismissed-as-defendant-in-9-11-lawsuits-1443581766 (“Plaintiffs’ attorneys have 
said a nuclear deal with Iran could open that country’s bank accounts to damage claims 
from the lawsuit and other terrorism cases.”). Notably, it appears that the U.S. 
government recognizes the risk that Iranian assets will be attached by creditors and has 
taken steps to avoid such attachment. For instance, in January 2016, the U.S. government 
transferred $400 million in cash contained in an Iranian cargo plane to Iran to pay debts 
owed from a pre-Islamic Revolution contract between the Pentagon and the Shah’s 
regime. Jay Solomon & Carol E. Lee, U.S. Held Cash Until Iran Freed Prisoners, WALL 
ST. J. (Aug. 18, 2016, 10:32 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-held-cash-until-iran-
freed-prisoners-1471469256. Some viewed this as a “ransom” payment for the release of 
U.S. hostages, while the Obama administration characterized the funds as “leverage” for 
the release of hostages. Carol E. Lee & Jay Solomon, U.S. Acknowledges Cash Payment to 
Iran was ‘Leverage’ in Prisoner Release, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 18, 2016, 7:24 PM), http://
www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-acknowledges-cash-payment-to-iran-was-leverage-in-prisoner-release
-1471558389. The fact that the U.S. government transferred these funds in cash, and has 
not publicly accounted for the transfer of the remainder of the funds owed to Iran as part 
of the pre-Islamic Revolution contract, may indicate that the government is protecting 
against the risk of attachment by creditors, including SST plaintiffs.  
95 N.C. L. REV. 795 (2017) 
2017] STATE-SPONSORED TERROR LITIGATION 829 
Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of Iran, has warned that the Accord 
will be terminated if there are any “repetitive and self-made pretexts” 
of new sanctions.187 
Khamanei’s comment alludes to the possibility of “sanctions” in 
the form of judgments for human rights abuses or terrorist activity.188 
In October 2015, Khamenei clarified this position when he tweeted 
that “[t]hroughout the 8-year term imposition of sanctions at any 
level and under any pretext	.	.	.	will be considered as [a] violation of 
the JCPOA.”189 The irony inherent in the SST exception is manifest—
if the victims are successful in recovering their judgments against Iran, 
it could spell doom for the Accord, which would give Iran an excuse 
to return to unabated and intensive uranium enrichment.190 In other 
words, the more plaintiffs recover from Iranian assets released as part 
of the Accord, the more likely a nuclear Iran becomes, which would 
pose a major security threat to the world. As noted earlier, the 
exception is a troublesome foreign policy tool that places the 
diplomatic goals of the executive branch at direct odds with the goals 
of private plaintiffs, as Iran’s case demonstrates.191 
C. SST Judgments Inhibit Iranian International Economic 
Integration and the Influence of American Soft Power 
There are deeper issues associated with the judgments against 
Iran. Even if judgment creditors are unable to grasp assets before 
they are returned to Iran as part of the Accord, Iran will remain 
inhibited and discouraged from reentering the international financial 
and trade community. This is largely a result of recent amendments 
passed by Congress that make it far easier to attach commercial assets 
 
 187. Thomas Erdbrink, Iran Nuclear Deal Wins Tepid Endorsement From Ayatollah 




 188. Id.; see also Ayatollah Khamenei (@khamenei_ir), TWITTER (Oct. 21, 2015, 5:36 
AM), https://twitter.com/khamenei_ir/status/656811370609012736/photo/1 [https://perma.cc
/78VN-RFE5]. 
 189. Khamenei, supra note 188. 
 190. JCPOA, supra note 1, at 17 (noting that when a dispute arises, “[i]f the issue still 
has not been resolved to the satisfaction of the complaining participant [after exhausting 
other methods of dispute resolution], and if the complaining participant deems the issue to 
constitute significant non-performance, then that participant could treat the unresolved 
issue as grounds to cease performing its commitments under this JCPOA in whole or in 
part and/or notify the UN Security Council that it believes the issue constitutes significant 
non-performance”). 
 191. See supra Section I.D.4. 
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belonging to an SST judgment debtor, even if the commercial assets 
are unrelated to terrorist activity.192 Thus, the judgments could not 
only deprive Iran of the benefit of the Accord’s bargain—economic 
parity with the rest of the world—but might also deprive the United 
States of the tacit benefit of its bargain—bringing about actual 
transformational change, beyond mere behavioral change, in Iran.193 
One of the Accord’s implicit goals is to create opportunities for future 
regime transformation within Iran. The best means of doing this, 
short of covert or overt military action, is through diplomacy and soft 
power.194 In fact, Iranian hardliners who sustain this regime, including 
the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (“IRGC”), are most afraid of 
this very power.195 Thus, if members of the Iranian financial 
community fear that their assets will be seized the moment they land 
in an American bank account, there is little hope that economic 
 
 192. See supra Section I.C.1. 
 193. ROBERT LITWAK, IRAN’S NUCLEAR CHESS: AFTER THE DEAL 5 (2014), https://
www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/irans_nuclear_chess_calculating_americas_moves.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/B7YK-QMLK] (noting the important difference between bringing about 
behavioral change in Iran as opposed to transformational regime change). Litwak also 
concluded that, “for Obama, the tacit transformational potential of this transactional deal 
is a hope; for Khamenei, it is a fear.” Robert S. Litwak, Nuclear Diplomacy with Iran: A 
Deal, Not a Grand Bargain, VIEWPOINTS, July 2015, at 3, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites
/default/files/nuclear_diplomacy_with_iran_deal_not_grand_bargain.pdf [https://perma.cc
/RQV6-TWES].  
 194. See generally JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN 
WORLD POLITICS (2004) (describing the theory of soft power as a means of bringing about 
change in foreign regimes). 
 195. Majid Rafizadeh, Iran Nuclear Deal: Four Concentric Circles, WORLD POST (July 
18, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/majid-rafizadeh/iran-nuclear-deal-four-co_b
_7825108.html [https://perma.cc/Y6LM-2USN] (“What the hardliners and ruling 
establishment fear the most is political (or economic) liberalization, which might lead to a 
soft cultural revolution and empowerment of the secular or oppositional groups. What 
they fear most is the cultural soft power of the West, mainly the United States, infiltrating 
Iranian society. Iranian leaders are cognizant of the fact that economic liberalization 
accompanied with political liberalization can endanger their hold on power. In other 
words, a more closed-off Iran ensures the current leadership of their rule and control over 
the population.”); see also David Ignatius, Despite the Nuclear Deal, Iran Continues its 
Economic Sabotage, WASH. POST (Dec. 29, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/opinions/iran-is-not-yet-open-for-business/2015/12/29/83deab38-ae42-11e5-9ab0-884d1cc4b33e
_story.html [https://perma.cc/2DAX-6YK6] (“Since the agreement was reached in July, 
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has repeatedly said that Iran won’t allow economic 
‘infiltration’ by a United States he described last month as a ‘deceitful, crafty, skillful, 
fraudulent and devilish enemy.’	” (first quoting Ishaan Tharoor, Khamenei Says Iran Will 
Block U.S. Influence, No Matter the Nuclear Deal, WASH. POST (Aug. 18, 2015), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/08/18/khamenei-says-iran-will-block-u-s
-influence-no-matter-the-nuclear-deal/?tid=a_inl&utm_term=.35441b857f42 [https://perma
.cc/FPA4-REMG]; then quoting Khamenei’s Counterrevolution Is Underway, FOREIGN 
POL’Y (Dec. 9, 2015), http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/12/09/khameneis-counter-revolution-
is-underway/ [https://perma.cc/78W6-VYEW]).  
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liberalization will occur, and that American soft power will be able to 
infiltrate the Iranian political economy.196 In short, the civil judgments 
against Iran may help the regime get exactly what it wants—the 
release of their assets—while depriving the United States of its 
ultimate goal of transformational regime change. 
D. SST Judgments Pose Political Challenges 
The judgments awarded to SST plaintiffs also pose a political 
obstacle to the Accord. The judgments hold special emotional appeal 
based on the horrific nature of the crimes committed against the 
victims.197 The emotional potency of the stories underlying these 
judgments is evident in former Republican presidential candidate and 
Texas Senator Ted Cruz’s speech to the House Judiciary 
Subcommittee in November 2015, where he began by discussing the 
gory details of an attack on an American family in Jerusalem.198 These 
ostensibly sincere concerns for terrorist victims have, at times, been 
used for other purposes. In fact, several members of Congress have 
already taken steps to convert this emotional appeal into political 
energy used to impede the Accord itself. Following the Accord, in 
October 2015, a bill known as the Justice for Victims of Iranian 
Terrorism Act was passed in the House of Representatives that would 
disallow lifting any sanctions on Iran until all judgments levied against 
Iran were paid in full.199 Several members of Congress attempted to 
drum up support for the bill by launching a public relations campaign 
 
 196. But see Ignatius, supra note 195 (detailing the work of groups such as iBridges and 
Atieh Bahar Consulting that seek to gather entrepreneurs and advise Western businesses 
interested in pursuing opportunities within Iran, but also noting the chilling effect that 
recent arrests of Iranian-American businessmen in Iran have had on trade talks). Iran is 
understandably wary of putting any assets of value in America; plaintiffs in the past have 
even gone after Iranian antiquities and artifacts in American museums to collect on their 
judgments. See Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 709 F.3d 49, 50 (1st Cir. 2013). 
 197. See supra Section II.A. 
 198. SenTedCruz, Sen. Ted Cruz Opening Statement on Victims of Iranian and 
Palestinian Terrorism, YOUTUBE (Nov. 17, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v
=ug90Leeyj5k [https://perma.cc/5UBN-7T2B] (“[A] Palestinian suicide bomber struck, 
sending shrapnel into [the victim’s] right eye and blood across her face	.	.	.	nearby a bone 
was sticking out of her mother’s leg. Even worse, a woman’s severed head laid just a few 
feet away.”).  
 199. Justice for Victims of Iranian Terrorism Act, H.R. 3457, 114th Cong. (2015). The 
bill was cosponsored by four North Carolina representatives. See H.R.3457—Justice for 
Victims of Iranian Terrorism Act, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill
/114th-congress/house-bill/3457/cosponsors?q=%7B%22cosponsor-state%22%3A%22North
+Carolina%22%7D [https://perma.cc/8E98-R8MJ]. 
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that included a YouTube video200 and a Twitter hashtag 
(“#NotOneCent”).201 
Although the bill did not pass in the Senate, it drew a spirited 
response from the executive branch.202 In an official statement, the 
Obama administration laid out several key positions, notably (1) any 
attempts to tie the JCPOA to collateral issues such as civil judgments 
will result in the unraveling of the Accord and (2) “[t]he 
Administration supports efforts by U.S. terrorism victims to pursue 
compensation, consistent with our national security, and the JCPOA 
does nothing to impede those efforts.”203 These comments provide a 
rare glance into the motivations of those inside the Obama 
administration. First, the administration appeared unwilling to 
recognize the reality that judgments against Iran and the JCPOA, 
though not legally linked, must be dealt with simultaneously or the 
JCPOA will be jeopardized by the sort of political posturing discussed 
above.204 Second, the administration made clear that it did not oppose 
to recovery of the judgments—as long as that recovery was consistent 
with national security.205 Beyond these political challenges, judgments 
against Iran also cause serious disadvantages for American businesses 
that would like to enter the lucrative Iranian market. 
E. SST Judgments Disadvantage American Business Prospects in 
Iran 
The judgments also limit the ability of certain Iranian agencies to 
purchase American products, which in turn infringes upon American 
businesses and individuals seeking to take advantage of the vast and 
largely untapped Iranian consumer market. A simple example 
 
 200. RepMeehan, #NotOneCent for Iran Until It Compensates Its Victims, YOUTUBE 
(Sept. 26, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?Source=GovD&v=DJwQ3ivy2Lg
#sthash.6eDz5W8k.dpuf [https://perma.cc/92F2-KWQT]. 
 201. See id.; see also Madaline Donnelly, Inspired to Stop Terrorism, Congressman 
Continues to Fight Iran Deal, DAILY SIGNAL (Sept. 29, 2015), http://dailysignal.com/2015
/09/29/inspired-to-stop-terrorism-congressman-continues-to-fight-iran-deal/ [https://perma.cc
/SQH4-VGJN] (including statements from Rep. Meehan, who sponsored the Justice for 
Victims of Iranian Terror Act); #NotOneCent: Meehan Bill Brings Justice for Victims of 
Iranian Terror, PAUL RYAN: SPEAKER (Oct. 1, 2015), http://www.speaker.gov/video
/notonecent-meehan-bill-brings-justice-victims-iranian-terror [https://perma.cc/PWH2-AVRS] 
(detailing Speaker of the House Paul Ryan’s endorsement of Rep. Meehan’s bill). 
 202. Statement of Administration Policy: H.R. 3457—Justice for Victims of Iranian 
Terrorism Act, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Sept. 30, 2015), http://www.presidency.ucsb
.edu/ws/index.php?pid=111314 [https://perma.cc/8USC-M96Z].  
 203. Id. (emphasis added). 
 204. See supra notes 197–201 and accompanying text. 
 205. See infra Part IV. 
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epitomizes the point. If IranAir wanted to purchase a half dozen 
Boeing 747s to update its aging fleet,206 IranAir would place its funds 
in an American bank account as escrow while the planes were 
manufactured.207 The Iranian government owns IranAir,208 so these 
funds would be subject to attachment by judgment creditors.209 
Accordingly, IranAir and similar Iran-affiliated entities would be 
expected to do business through back channels or through foreign 
banks to avoid attachment by SST judgment creditors. This example 
shows how SST judgments can discourage trade between Iran and the 
United States, placing American businesses, financial institutions, and 
individuals seeking economic opportunities in Iran at a disadvantage 
while the rest of the world enters the Iranian market bearing gifts and 
leaving with suitcases full of cash.210 Ultimately, American businesses 
and Iranian entities may conclude that the profit potential outweighs 
the litigation risk of doing business, as Boeing appears to have done 
 
 206. Iran Air has one of the worst safety records in the world because of its inability to 
purchase American airplanes and airplane parts from manufacturers such as Boeing. 
Kieron Monks, Iran’s Aviation Industry: Back in Business?, CNN (Sept. 9, 2015, 6:50 AM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2015/09/09/travel/irans-aviation-industry/ [https://perma.cc/293E-8Y8Z]. 
The average age of the Iran Air fleet is approximately twenty-two years. Id. Iran is 
estimated to buy 300 new airplanes over the next ten years at a value of $18 billion. Id. 
 207. See Escrow Services, AERO-SPACE REPORTS, https://aerospacereports.com
/services/escrow [https://perma.cc/82MM-XRTX] (offering “aircraft escrow services with a 
level of confidentiality and security that is unmatched”); see also Sample Aircraft 
Purchase/Sales Agreement, AOPA, https://www.aopa.org/go-fly/aircraft-and-ownership
/buying-an-aircraft/forms-for-buying-and-selling-aircraft/sample-purchase-sales-agreement 
[https://perma.cc/CYC7-32R4]. Of course, there are ways to evade this result, such as using 
intermediaries outside of the United States. See, e.g., Erin Banco, How Iran’s Airlines 
Purchased Boeing and Airbus Planes, Bypassing US Sanctions, INT’L BUS. TIMES (June 29, 
2016, 8:19 AM), http://www.ibtimes.com/how-irans-airlines-purchased-boeing-airbus-
planes-bypassing-us-sanctions-2387924 [https://perma.cc/K594-FWC5]. 
 208. About Us, IRANAIR, http://www.iranair.de/en/about.html [https://perma.cc/4D8S-
8CNP ].  
 209. See supra Section I.C.1. But see OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, U.S. 
DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, STATEMENT OF LICENSING POLICY FOR ACTIVITIES 
RELATED TO THE EXPORT OR RE-EXPORT TO IRAN OF COMMERCIAL PASSENGER 
AIRCRAFT AND RELATED PARTS AND SERVICES (2016), https://www.treasury.gov/resource
-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/lic_pol_statement_aircraft_jcpoa.pdf [https://perma.cc
/APW2-RLWS] (allowing licenses to be granted on a case-by-case basis for the sale of 
airplanes and airplane parts to Iran, which may provide a ready defense against 
attachment of escrow accounts created for the purpose of purchasing American airplane 
parts).  
 210. Or vice versa. For example, China has continued to purchase Iranian oil despite 
the sanctions regime. See Northam, supra note 25. In the meantime, money owed to Iran 
for this oil has accumulated in banks around the world and Iran has purchased Chinese 
products on credit. Id. When sanctions lift, the remaining funds on the Iranian ledger will 
flood Iranian banks for the first time in years, and Chinese businesspeople have already 
created trade inroads due to years of sales on oil credit. Id. 
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by agreeing to sell dozens of 737 and 777 aircraft models to Iran.211 
Regardless, the increased risk of litigation remains a powerful barrier 
to international trade among the two countries.212 
Perhaps allowing plaintiffs to collect on Iran’s frozen assets and 
other assets is exactly what justice requires, despite the fact that 
American businesses will be disadvantaged. This is especially true 
considering the fact that Iran could utilize these funds to support 
terror in the Middle East and beyond.213 However, this elides a simple 
reality succinctly clarified by President Obama: “We’re not writing 
Iran a check,	.	.	. This is Iran’s money that we were able to block from 
them having access to.”214 In other words, releasing the funds is simply 
one of the realities (and requirements) associated with reaching a 
diplomatic compromise.215 Furthermore, if American lawmakers are 
seriously concerned about Iran using newly accessed assets to support 
terrorism, it would seem that the worst policy decision available 
would be to create an incentive structure that would encourage Iran 
to hide assets and develop phantom accounts.216 However, the ability 
to attach Iranian assets held in American banks will encourage Iran to 
do just that. It is better to know where the money is and sacrifice 
attachment than to risk forcing Iranian money underground, where it 
 
 211. See Golnar Motevalli & Deena Kamel, Iran Air Agrees to Buy Boeing 737, 777 
Jets in Landmark Deal, BLOOMBERG (June 21, 2016, 1:49 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com
/news/articles/2016-06-21/iran-air-signs-agreement-to-buy-boeing-737-777-airplanes [https://
perma.cc/68NR-GB57].  
 212. Emanuele Ottolenghi, The Risks of the Iran-Boeing Deal, HILL (June 21, 2016, 
11:59 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/international/284269-the-risks-of-the-
iran-boeing-deal [https://perma.cc/2JTM-H2KC] (noting the risk that lawyers for SST 
plaintiffs will levy lawsuits to attach assets transferred as part of Boeing transaction).  
 213. Northam, supra note 25 (recounting Executive Director of the Foundation for 
Defense of Democracies Mark Dubowitz’s assertion that “[w]e have no ability to constrain 
Iran if they want to spend all $100 billion on funding Hezbollah or other terrorist 
organizations	.	.	.	. But when you’re getting a $100 billion-plus cash windfall, even if you’re 
spending 5 to 10 percent of that only on the regional activities and your support for 
terrorism, that’s an extra $5 to $10 billion dollars-plus”).  
 214. Id. 
 215. This point is certainly debatable. However, it is supported by the fact that the 
executive branch froze Iranian assets to create a bargaining chip for later negotiations, not 
for the purpose of compensating SST plaintiffs. See supra Section I.C.1. 
 216. If Iran can’t hold its assets in international banks, it is certain to find other 
methods of trading, making it more difficult to track the flow of Iranian assets. Steven R. 
Perles & Edward B. MacAllister, Counter-Terrorism Civil Litigation: An Ever-Widening 
Net, 9 ANDREWS BANK & LENDER LIABILITY LITIG. REP. 12 (2003) (pointing out that 
banks should not do business with state sponsors of terrorism in any capacity if they wish 
to avoid civil liability that has been created by the rise of criminal anti-terror funding 
statutes following 9/11).  
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may be routed more easily to terrorist organizations.217 Yet, there are 
some who view the funds that Iran will access after the Accord as only 
a small portion of the total benefit to Iran. 
Elizabeth Rosenberg, who worked on Iran sanctions matters at 
the U.S. Treasury Department as a senior advisor to the Assistant 
Secretary for Terrorist Financing as well as a senior advisor to the 
Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence,218 presents 
a more optimistic perspective. Rosenberg notes that, “while $100 
billion sounds like a lot of money, it pales in comparison to the 
economic relief Iran can expect if and when companies begin to trade 
and invest with it. And this would be an incentive for Iran to stick to 
the agreement.”219 From this perspective, even if all the SST plaintiffs 
are awarded every dime they are owed, Iran would still come out with 
approximately $57 billion,220 with more to come once trade ramps 
up.221 The problem with such a perspective is that, although Iran 
might not miss $43 billion in the long run, those funds are necessary 
to jumpstart its lagging economy and can be put to immediate use 
improving oil infrastructure, telecommunications, and other 
important development initiatives. If those funds go missing, 
hardliners in Iran have a convenient excuse for breaking the rules of 
the Accord.222 
In sum, there are many obstacles created by the billions of 
dollars in judgments pending against Iran. Both Iran and the United 
States stand to lose access to the very benefits of the Accord that 
made it a bargain for each of them, respectively. From the Iranian 
perspective, the judgments might take a massive bite out of the frozen 
assets it is set to access. The judgments might also make it difficult for 
ordinary Iranian agencies, such as IranAir, to purchase necessary 
American products, and these judgments will impede long-term 
 
 217. This theory has been noted in the context of Alternative Remittance Systems as 
well, where a policy of registration of such systems is preferred over outright prohibition 
in order to avoid driving such systems further underground. UNITED NATIONS COUNTER-
TERRORISM IMPLEMENTATION TASK FORCE, TACKLING THE FINANCING OF 
TERRORISM 13 (2009), http://www.un.org/en/terrorism/ctitf/pdfs/ctitf_financing_eng_final
.pdf [https://perma.cc/4UU5-H6TL]. 
 218. Elizabeth Rosenberg, CNAS, https://www.cnas.org/people/elizabeth-rosenberg 
[https://perma.cc/J232-QL6C]. 
 219. Northam, supra note 25. 
 220. This assumes a payout of $100 billion and that judgments currently pending 
against Iran total $43 billion. See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 161, at 4. 
 221. Northam, supra note 25. 
 222. See supra notes 185–91 and accompanying text. Even if Iran were to pay its 
judgment creditors over an extended time period, this would provide ample and ongoing 
opportunities for withdrawal from the Accord. 
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normalization efforts. From the American perspective, the judgments 
discourage trade between American corporations and Iran, which 
diminishes opportunities for economic liberalization and the exercise 
of American soft power. Furthermore, the judgments remain a 
politically and emotionally polarizing tool that can be leveraged to 
create apprehension among the American public about the Accord. 
Taken together, these factors inevitably increase the likelihood that 
the Accord may fall apart when the issue of judgments presents itself. 
If the Accord dissolves, it could set into motion a series of events that 
culminates in a nuclear Iran or a military confrontation.223 Although 
the Accord has been hailed by some as “one of the greatest 
diplomatic achievements of the 21st century[,]”224 its failure may well 
be remembered as a depressing end to a story that could have 
reignited the world’s faith in diplomacy.225 In pursuit of averting such 
a disastrous result, the following two Parts present steps that Iran and 
the United States can take, respectively, to protect the Accord that 
took herculean efforts to construct. 
 
 223. The risk of a military confrontation is real, especially in the uncertain aftermath of 
the recent presidential election. Greg Jaffe & Adam Entous, As a General, Mattis Urged 
Action Against Iran. As a Defense Secretary, He May Be a Voice of Caution, WASH. POST 




 224. 161 CONG. REC. H5901 (2015) (statement of Rep. Pelosi). 
 225. Through such efforts, the United States may achieve the sort of diplomatic peace 
envisioned years ago by President John F. Kennedy when he encouraged  
a more practical, more attainable peace, based not on a sudden revolution in 
human nature but on a gradual evolution in human institutions—on a series of 
concrete actions and effective agreements which are in the interest of all 
concerned. There is no single, simple key to this peace, no grand or magic formula 
to be adopted by one or two powers. Genuine peace must be the product of many 
nations, the sum of many acts. It must be dynamic, not static, changing to meet the 
challenge of each new generation. For peace is a process, a way of solving 
problems. With such a peace there will still be quarrels and conflicting interests, as 
there are within families and nations. World peace, like community peace, does 
not require that each man love his neighbor; it requires only that they live together 
in mutual tolerance, submitting their disputes to a just and peaceful settlement. 
Towards a Strategy of Peace, supra note 15. President Obama invoked these very words 
upon his acceptance of the Nobel Peace Prize and, once again, after finalizing the Accord. 
Obama, supra note 15; Obama, supra note 2.  
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III.  SHOW UP IN COURT: DEFAULT JUDGMENTS AND IRAN’S ROLE 
IN MITIGATING OBSTACLES CREATED BY SST JUDGMENTS 
The United States is not the only party that has work to do in 
order to overcome the obstacles posed by the SST judgments. Iran, 
like many other sovereigns, has chosen to default on almost every 
lawsuit brought against it under the SST exception.226 As Professor 
William P. Hoye notes: 
As a result, a very unusual and lopsided body of case law has 
developed under the Act, comprised almost entirely of 
unrefuted and unchallenged evidence presented by plaintiffs in 
the cases. Until a more broadly based group of successful 
plaintiffs are able to collect routinely on judgments awarded 
under the Act, without the extraordinary and unusual remedy 
of special legislation, there seems to be little incentive for 
foreign state defendants or their agents to appear, much less to 
defend themselves aggressively, in Antiterrorism Act cases.227 
This Comment argues that challenging these lawsuits would help Iran 
conduct damage control and even to challenge the validity of some of 
the massive judgments levied against them.228 It also argues that doing 
so would help minimize the impact these judgments may have on the 
Accord. As judgments mount, the opportunity for a settlement 
diminishes. If the odds of a settlement are reduced, the likelihood that 
these judgments will remain an impediment to the Accord is 
increased. Therefore, mitigating the value of the judgments will serve 
to strengthen the Accord and improve the likelihood of 
normalization. 
There are multiple disadvantages to default that Iran could 
remedy should it choose to defend against future lawsuits: (1) Iran 
can dispute the evidence put forward by plaintiffs establishing the key 
element required for recovery—that Iran provided material support 
to the organization that victimized them; (2) Iran can challenge the 
substantial punitive damages awarded to plaintiffs; and (3) in some 
 
 226. It appears this may be changing. Very recently, Iran chose to dispute the 
attachment of bonds held by the Central Bank of Iran as foreign currency reserves. See 
Brief for Petitioner at 1–2, Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310 (2016) (No. 14-770); 
Nina Totenberg, In Iranian Funds Case, Justices Ponder Extent of Congressional Influence, 
NPR (Jan. 13, 2016, 4:42 PM), http://www.npr.org/2016/01/13/462950424/supreme-court-
divided-over-iranian-terrorism-compensation-case [https://perma.cc/R7YC-Q7JV]. Notable 
exceptions where other foreign sovereigns have chosen not to default include Daliberti v. 
Republic of Iraq, 97 F. Supp. 2d 38 (D.D.C. 2000), and Rein v. Socialist People’s Libyan 
Arab Jamahiriya, 995 F. Supp. 325 (E.D.N.Y. 1998). 
 227. Hoye, supra note 87, at 136 
 228. See infra Sections III.A–C. 
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cases, Iran will be able to challenge lawsuits on procedural and 
evidentiary grounds. 
A. Litigating “Material Support” 
Many of the cases brought against Iran allege that material 
support was provided for terrorist organizations, such as Hezbollah or 
Hamas, that committed terrorist acts against Americans.229 One key 
issue that has never been challenged is the meaning of “material 
support” as it is used in the SST exception.230 U.S. courts have 
consistently held that Iran provides material support to the 
aforementioned terrorist groups.231 However, Iran has never 
challenged the notion that financial support to a group such as Hamas 
for some purposes is not necessarily equivalent to financial support 
for terrorist purposes.232 For example, if Iran provides medical 
supplies to Hamas in the Gaza Strip, where millions of people face an 
Israeli embargo on such supplies,233 is Iran then liable for any terrorist 
crimes that Hamas may commit? 
Furthermore, Iran has never challenged whether Hamas or 
Hezbollah condoned the various terrorist attacks or whether rogue 
members of the groups carried them out.234 In the face of Iranian 
 
 229. See, e.g., Leibovitch v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 697 F.3d 561, 562 (7th Cir. 2012); 
Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 637 F.3d 783, 785 (7th Cir. 2011); Weinstein v. Islamic 
Republic of Iran, 609 F.3d 43, 46 (2d Cir. 2010); Oveissi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 573 
F.3d 835, 838 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Hegna v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 376 F.3d 226, 230 (4th 
Cir. 2004); Bettis v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 315 F.3d 325, 327 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Flatow v. 
Islamic Republic of Iran, 308 F.3d 1065, 1067 (9th Cir. 2002); Peterson v. Islamic Republic 
of Iran, 515 F. Supp. 2d 25, 37 (D.D.C. 2007); Bennett v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 507 F. 
Supp. 2d 117, 126 (D.D.C. 2007); Greenbaum v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 451 F. Supp. 2d 
90, 94 (D.D.C. 2006); Campuzano v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 281 F. Supp. 2d 258, 270 
(D.D.C. 2003); Sutherland v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 151 F. Supp. 2d 27, 46 (D.D.C. 
2001).  
 230. 28 U.S.C. §	1605A(a)(1) (2012); see also 18 U.S.C. §	2339A(b)(1)(2012) (defining 
material support). 
 231. See, e.g., Bodoff v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 907 F. Supp. 2d 93, 102 (D.D.C. 
2012); Wultz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 864 F. Supp. 2d 24, 35 (D.D.C. 2012); Anderson 
v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 753 F. Supp. 2d 68, 84 (D.D.C. 2010), judgment entered 839 F. 
Supp. 2d 263 (D.D.C. 2012); Murphy v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 740 F. Supp. 2d 51, 71 
(D.D.C. 2010). 
 232. See generally Haim Malka, Hamas: Resistance and Transformation of Palestinian 
Society, in UNDERSTANDING ISLAMIC CHARITIES 98 (Jon B. Alterman & Karin von 
Hippel eds., 2007) (discussing the various welfare activities carried out by Hamas in Gaza).  
 233. 2016 Marks Ten Years of Israeli Siege, Illegal Blockade of Gaza, GLOBAL RES. 
(Jan. 4, 2016), http://www.globalresearch.ca/2016-marks-ten-years-of-israeli-siege-illegal-
blockade-of-gaza/5499129 [https://perma.cc/J888-ZWMK].  
 234. This theory has proven successful in at least one case, despite the fact that Iran 
defaulted and the theory was merely a consequence of the judge’s independent reasoning 
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silence, courts have ruled liberally in favor of plaintiffs. For instance, 
courts have found that there need not be a nexus between the funding 
provided by Iran and the terrorist activity that is carried out, relying 
on a proximate causation test rather than the more stringent but-for 
causation test traditionally relied upon in tort law.235 Considering, for 
instance, that the key element of an intentional tort is the requisite 
intent,236 Iran might find a variety of favorable legal arguments at its 
disposal if it would enter the courthouse. 
An example highlights the point. In Havlish v. Bin Laden (In re 
Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001),237 a federal district court 
awarded over $6 billion in damages to family members of Americans 
killed in the World Trade Center on September 11th, 2001.238 Iran was 
earlier found liable for materially supporting the individuals 
associated with the attacks,239 in spite of the fact that the National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States found “no 
evidence that Iran or Hezbollah was aware of the planning for what 
later became the 9/11 attack[,]”240 and President Bush’s comments 
that “[t]here was no direct connection between Iran and the attacks of 
Sept. 11.”241 These plaintiffs were forced to concentrate their recovery 
efforts on Iran because the FSIA barred them from seeking 
judgments against another potentially culpable 9/11 supporter—Saudi 
Arabia—which is not designated as a state sponsor of terror.242 
 
on the matter. See Ungar v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 211 F. Supp. 2d 91, 93, 100 (D.D.C. 
2002). 
 235. See Kilburn v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 376 F.3d 1123, 1127–28 
(D.C. Cir. 2004) (noting that, in the FSIA SST exception, “the words ‘but for’ simply do 
not appear; only ‘caused by’ do”). 
 236. Chen v. United States, 674 F. Supp. 1078, 1086 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (“The elements of 
prima facie tort are infliction of intentional harm; lack of excuse or justification; harm 
inflicted by an act that would otherwise be lawful; and special damages.”), aff’d, 854 F.2d 
622 (2d Cir. 1988). 
 237. No. 03-MDL-1570, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110673 (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 2012). 
 238. Id. at *92. 
 239. Havlish v. Bin Laden (In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001), No. 03-
MDL-1570, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155899, at *197 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2011). 
 240. NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION 
REPORT 241 (2004). But see Benjamin Weiser & Scott Shane, Court Filings Assert Iran 
Had Link to 9/11 Attacks, N.Y. TIMES (May 19, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/20
/world/middleeast/20terror.html?_r=1 [https://perma.cc/RV9B-V9K7 (staff-uploaded archive)] 
(noting some of the evidence supporting the claim that Iran played a role in 9/11).  
 241. Ken Timmerman, Lawsuit: Iran Knew About 9/11 Attack, NEWSMAX (May 19, 
2011, 2:12 PM), http://www.newsmax.com/KenTimmerman/al-qaida-osamabinladen-911-
september11/2011/05/19/id/396993/ [https://perma.cc/X9K6-7JDN]. 
 242. In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 538 F.3d 71, 75 (2d Cir. 2008). This 
changed on September 28, 2016, with the passage of the Justice Against Sponsors of 
Terrorism Act (“JASTA”), which creates a cause of action against any foreign state that 
causes injury to American citizens on American soil. See Justice Against Sponsors of 
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This uncomfortable reality illuminates the collateral effects of 
the unfair characteristics of the SST exception.243 Under the current 
framework, deserving plaintiffs have no choice but to bring weak 
claims against sovereigns tangentially responsible for their injuries 
because the sovereign happens to be a designated state sponsor of 
terror. Meanwhile, sovereigns not on the list that may bear moral and 
factual responsibility for plaintiffs’ injuries avoid legal culpability. 
Iran stands a chance to win cases like this one, or at least balance out 
the facts, if it would show up in court. Challenging SST judgments 
could help curtail the mounting judgments obtained against Iran, 
thereby mitigating the risk that these judgments will destroy the 
Accord. 
B. Litigating the Validity of Hyper-Inflated Judgments 
Iran would benefit from defending these lawsuits in another 
realm as well. Judges consistently award SST plaintiffs astronomical 
judgments that include compensatory damages, solatium, pain and 
suffering, and punitive damages.244 Although Iran may be unable to 
defend against certain substantive claims in cases where Iran is 
factually responsible, Iran should still litigate to temper and balance 
the hyper-inflated245 damages awarded to SST plaintiffs. If Iran 
participated, for example, damage awards for severe emotional 
distress to immediate family members of victims could be 
challenged.246 Although a key element of such claims is that the family 
member was present during the attack,247 courts have waived this 
element in the unique context of terrorism cases.248 Iran would have 
 
Terrorism Act, Pub. L. No. 114-222, §	3, 130 Stat. 852, 853 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §	1605B). 
A complaint against Saudi Arabia for its involvement in 9/11 was filed only weeks after 
the passage of this legislation, and more complaints are expected. Complaint at 1, 
McCarthy v. Saudi Arabia, No. 1:16-cv-08884 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 2016).  
 243. See supra Section I.D.5. 
 244. 28 U.S.C. §	1605A(c)(4) (2012). 
 245. The damages awarded to SST plaintiffs tend to be astronomical. Although making 
a comparison between the amounts awarded in these cases and the amount of damages 
awarded in regular wrongful death actions is difficult due to insufficient data, damage 
awards to SST plaintiffs reaching the hundreds of millions of dollars appear excessive, 
prima facie. See generally Ralph Peeples & Catherine T. Harris, What is a Life Worth in 
North Carolina? A Look at Wrongful-Death Awards, 37 CAMPBELL L. REV. 497 (2015) 
(empirically studying 123 wrongful death claims in North Carolina over a five-year 
period). 
 246. See Murphy v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 740 F. Supp. 2d 51, 74–76 (D.D.C. 2010). 
 247. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §	46(1)–(2)(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
 248. See Murphy, 740 F. Supp. 2d at 75–76 (D.D.C. 2010) (The court stated that “[i]f 
the defendants’ conduct is sufficiently outrageous and intended to inflict severe emotional 
harm upon a person which is not present, no essential reason of logic or policy prevents 
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the opportunity to litigate the validity of waiving this key element, if 
only Iran would come to court. 
In the arena of punitive damages, Iran would also benefit from 
litigating damage awards. In Murphy v. Islamic Republic of Iran,249 
Judge Royce Lamberth, who sits on the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Columbia, noted a problem with punitive damages in the 
context of the FSIA: “Recurrent awards in case after case arising out 
of the same facts can financially cripple a defendant, over-punishing 
the same conduct through repeated awards with little additional 
deterrent effect, and awards in several cases arising out of the same 
facts can differ, creating anomalous results.”250 Despite these 
considerations, once a compensatory-punitive damages ratio is 
established for one SST case, it is often applied to all related 
actions.251 Therefore, it is important that Iran defend against any 
damages claim, because failure to do so could set a precedent for 
future actions with similar facts. 
An example is instructive: For the Beirut barracks bombings in 
1983, Judge Lamberth (who has described the negative consequences 
of over-punishing SST defendants) departed from existing FSIA 
precedent and awarded plaintiffs punitive damages equivalent to five 
times the amount that Iran allegedly funded terrorist organizations in 
the preceding calendar year.252 Before this decision, courts had 
remained conservative and opted for the minimum punitive damages 
necessary for deterrence, as testified to by experts, which was 
approximately three times the amount that Iran allegedly funded 
terrorist organizations in the preceding calendar year.253 If Iran had 
shown up in court, Iran may have at least mitigated the massive 
judgments levied against it and thereby avoided an unfavorable 
precedent. 
 
liability.’	.	.	. As this Court has noted, ‘[t]errorism, unique among the types of tortious 
activities in both its extreme methods and aims, passes this test easily.’	” (first and third 
alterations in original) (quoting Estate of Heiser v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 659 F. Supp. 
2d 20, 27 (D.D.C. 2009))).  
 249. 740 F. Supp. 2d 51 (D.D.C. 2010). 
 250. Id. at 81. 
 251. Id. at 81–83 (applying the same compensatory-punitive damages ratio (3.44) found 
in a related action). 
 252. Valore v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 700 F. Supp. 2d 52, 88–90 (D.D.C. 2010). In a 
bizarre attempt to explain this departure from precedent, Lamberth noted that Iran’s 
recent increased responsiveness to litigation was part of the reason for the increased 
damages award. Lamberth stated, “This higher number is based on the suggestion by Dr. 
Clawson that Iran has recently begun to more actively participate in litigation in the 
United States and elsewhere.” Id. at 89. 
 253. Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 34 (D.D.C. 1998). 
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C. Litigating Cases on Procedural Grounds 
Finally, if Iran appeared in court, some of the claims brought 
against it would likely be dismissed on procedural grounds. Any 
action brought under the SST exception must be filed within ten years 
of the date the cause of action arose, or, if the cause of action arose 
prior to enactment of the exception, within ten years of April 24, 
1996.254 Despite this temporal limitation, a U.S. court has never 
chosen to enforce it because it has been deemed waived by the 
defendants’ absence.255 Iran could save itself from more massive 
judgments simply by asserting the time limitation. For example, in 
2015, a civil action was filed on behalf of military personnel injured in 
the 1983 Beirut bombing.256 Iran, once again, defaulted.257 The 
plaintiffs in that case seek a total of approximately $2.5 billion in 
damages.258 Although the lawsuit clearly falls outside the time 
limitations prescribed by Congress because Iran has defaulted, the 
statute of limitations will likely be deemed waived. 
There are also certain evidentiary disadvantages that Iran could 
remedy through litigation. For example, if an SST defendant defaults, 
evidence “satisfactory to the court” must be found to hold the SST 
defendant liable.259 In default, “[t]he court may accept all 
uncontroverted evidence as true, which may take the form of sworn 
affidavits or prior transcripts. A court may also take judicial notice of 
findings and conclusions in related proceedings.”260 This standard is 
lower than the traditional “preponderance of the evidence standard” 
 
 254. 28 U.S.C. §	1605A(b) (2012). 
 255. Out of the cases reviewed, the matter was never raised or even considered. See 
supra Section II.A. 
 256. First Amended Complaint at 3, Relvas v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 1:14-cv-
01752-RCL (D.D.C. Mar. 6, 2015), http://www.cohenmilstein.com/media/pnc/7/media.1737
.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZXH3-JPUZ].  
 257. Default Order at 1, Relvas v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 1:14-cv-01752 (D.D.C. 
Nov. 30, 2015), http://www.cohenmilstein.com/media/pnc/1/media.1851.pdf [https://perma
.cc/3SST-HXZA].  
 258. See First Amended Complaint, supra note 256, at 27–32.  
 259. §	1608(e) (“No judgment by default shall be entered by a court of the United 
States or of a State against a foreign state, a political subdivision thereof, or an agency or 
instrumentality of a foreign state, unless the claimant establishes his claim or right to relief 
by evidence satisfactory to the court.”); see also COOPER-HILL, supra note 33, at 142–44 
(discussing, in detail, the interaction of default judgments proceedings in SST cases and 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). 
 260. Portnoy et al., supra note 96, at 612 (citing Fain v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 856 F. 
Supp. 2d 109, 115 (D.D.C. 2012)). 
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used in most civil tort cases.261 Courts have rarely found evidence 
presented in SST cases against Iran to be unsatisfactory.262 
Iran may also be able to challenge attachment proceedings on 
procedural grounds if Iran is willing to come to court. In the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Columbia, for instance, if a judgment 
is not renewed within twelve years of being entered, the judgment 
expires.263 Therefore, if plaintiffs’ attorneys have overlooked the 
periodic revival of judgments, any attachment proceedings on the 
basis of those underlying judgments are void if the judgments are 
older than twelve years. 
Thus, from the Iranian perspective, there is much to gain by 
showing up in court. Iran would be able to challenge the enormous 
damage awards that have been granted, enforce procedural 
requirements, and litigate the substantive grounds upon which the 
judgments are based. Furthermore, Iran’s presence in the courtroom 
would be beneficial as a counterweight to the oftentimes prejudiced 
and one-sided precedent that is currently churning out of U.S. federal 
courthouses. By defending against these judgments, Iran can mitigate 
the sheer size of the judgments that continue to pile up against it. As 
judgments mount and reach unprecedented levels, the possibility of a 
settlement becomes more abstract because even a settlement would 
be extremely costly.264 Without a settlement of these judgments, the 
Accord becomes less tenable.265 Therefore, if Iran defends itself, it can 
help ensure that the SST judgments do not sabotage the Accord. 
IV.  THE UNITED STATES’ ROLE IN PROTECTING THE ACCORD 
From the American perspective, there are also a variety of 
options available that could help mitigate the risk that the SST 
judgments adversely affect the Accord. First, the executive branch 
 
 261. E.g., Lilienthal’s Tobacco v. United States, 97 U.S. 237, 266 (1878); Livanovitch v. 
Livanovitch, 131 A. 799, 800 (Vt. 1926). 
 262. When default judgments are not granted because evidence is unsatisfactory, it is 
usually because the plaintiffs do not have sufficient standing, Mohammadi v. Islamic 
Republic of Iran, 947 F. Supp. 2d 48, 54 (D.D.C. 2013), or because a foreign law was found 
to be applicable, Estate of Botvin ex rel. Ellis v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 684 F. Supp. 2d 
34, 36 (D.D.C. 2010) (applying Israeli law). 
 263. D.C. CODE §	15-101 (LEXIS through Jan. 2017). 
 264. Even under current judgments, a settlement that awarded twenty cents on the 
dollar to all SST plaintiffs would result in at least $10 billion in liability for Iran. This 
would be a massive settlement, especially relative to the liability arising from the U.S-Iran 
Claims Tribunal, which amounted to more than $2.5 billion. See Iran-U.S. Claims 
Tribunal, U.S. DEP’T STATE, http://www.state.gov/s/l/3199.htm [https://perma.cc/496A-
9QPE].  
 265. See supra Part II. 
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retains access to a powerful argument that the SST judgments pose a 
risk to national security.266 Second, there is precedent for resolving 
terrorism-related judgments as part of an executive agreement or 
settlement with the foreign sovereign. Solving the judgment crisis will 
not be an easy task—both lawmakers and the President must balance 
the goal of compensating victims for horrific acts of violence against 
the goal of maintaining a tenuous Accord with Iran which is intended 
to avert catastrophic results in the Middle East and beyond. This Part 
considers how to strike this balance. 
A review of existing case law and examples in this area proves 
helpful. There are two key historical examples of the executive 
branch restructuring judgments: Iran after the 1979 Islamic 
Revolution and Libya in 2008. 
A. Dames & Moore v. Regan: Restructuring Judgments Against Iran 
Post-1979 Islamic Revolution 
Early in his presidency, President Ronald Reagan nullified 
terrorism-related judgments against Iran. Following the Islamic 
Revolution in 1979 and at the direction of President Jimmy Carter, 
the United States blocked any Iranian assets held in American banks 
to create leverage for the release of hostages held by Iranian 
revolutionaries at the U.S. embassy in Tehran.267 On January 20, 1981, 
444 days after the American embassy was raided, the American 
hostages were released pursuant to an agreement that obligated the 
United States 
to terminate all legal proceedings in United States courts 
involving claims of United States persons and institutions 
against Iran and its state enterprises, to nullify all attachments 
and judgments obtained therein, to prohibit all further litigation 
based on such claims, and to bring about the termination of 
such claims through binding arbitration.268 
 
 266. See supra Part II. 
 267. See Exec. Order No. 12,170, 44 Fed. Reg. 65,729, 65,729 (Nov. 14, 1979). See 
generally STEPHEN KINZER, ALL THE SHAH’S MEN: AN AMERICAN COUP AND THE 
ROOTS OF MIDDLE EAST TERROR (2003) (providing a detailed and in-depth discussion of 
the history of relations between the United States and Iran).  
 268. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 665 (1981) (quoting Declaration of the 
Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, Iran-U.S., initialed Jan. 
19, 1981, 20 I.L.M. 224, 224).  
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President Reagan ratified a number of executive orders effectuating 
this agreement, which required that any judgments be nullified and 
referred to the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal.269 
The seminal case of Dames & Moore v. Regan270 arose directly 
out of these events. In that case, Dames & Moore, an engineering and 
construction firm that often contracted for the U.S. government, had 
successfully brought suit against Iran for Iran’s failure to pay for work 
that it contracted with Dames & Moore to perform.271 Dames & 
Moore was awarded more than $3 million in damages, Iranian assets 
in American bank accounts were blocked, and Dames & Moore 
attempted to execute the judgment through writs of garnishment.272 
However, pursuant to President Reagan’s executive orders and the 
agreement with Iran, all prejudgment attachments of Iranian property 
were vacated, all future litigation against the Central Bank of Iran 
was suspended, and the case was referred to the Iran-U.S. Claims 
Tribunal.273 Dames & Moore then brought suit against the United 
States alleging that 
the actions of the President and the Secretary of the Treasury 
implementing the Agreement with Iran were beyond their 
statutory and constitutional powers and, in any event, were 
unconstitutional to the extent they adversely affect petitioner’s 
final judgment against the Government of Iran and the Atomic 
Energy Organization, its execution of that judgment in the 
State of Washington, its prejudgment attachments, and its 
ability to continue to litigate against the Iranian banks.274 
The Supreme Court held that the executive orders enforcing the 
agreement with Iran were constitutional. The Court concluded that 
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”)275 
 
 269. Id. at 666. See generally THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL AND THE 
PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS RESOLUTION: A STUDY BY THE PANEL ON STATE 
RESPONSIBILITY OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (David D. 
Caron & John R. Crook eds., 2000) (using personal accounts from Tribunal participants to 
document the procedural and institutional “life” of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal). For 
more information about the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, see About the Tribunal, IRAN-U.S. 
CLAIMS TRIBUNAL, https://www.iusct.net/Pages/Public/A-About.aspx [https://perma.cc
/P376-BPLE]; Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, supra note 264.  
 270. 453 U.S. 654 (1981). 
 271. Id. at 663–64. Ironically, Dames & Moore was conducting site studies for a 
proposed nuclear facility in Iran. Id. at 664. 
 272. See id. at 664, 666. 
 273. Id. at 666. 
 274. Id. at 667. 
 275. International Emergency Economic Powers Act, Pub. L. No. 95-223, 91 Stat. 1626 
(1977) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§	1701–06 (2012)).  
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implicitly authorized the nullification of claims against Iran,276 and 
that the “general tenor” of existing laws and presidential practice 
authorized the suspension of all pending claims against Iran.277 The 
Court recognized that congressional authorization combined with the 
President’s inherent duty to manage foreign relations justified the 
President’s choice to block Iranian assets.278 The Court noted that a 
key function of blocking foreign assets is to create leverage for 
negotiations, essentially placing a “bargaining chip” in the hands of 
the president.279 The Court reasoned that allowing individual 
claimants to dissolve this bargaining chip through attachments would 
weaken the President’s negotiating power.280 
In regard to the suspension of all pending claims against Iran, the 
Court did not find any explicit congressional authorization for the 
President to take such action.281 The Court nonetheless found that the 
“general tenor” of legislation in the area and historical practice 
demonstrating acquiescence to presidential settlements supported the 
President’s settling of claims against Iran.282 The Court’s dictum on 
this matter was telling. The Court recognized that executive 
settlement of international claims is an accepted and long-standing 
tool that has been wielded to reach agreements with hostile or 
belligerent foreign states.283 The Court also noted “many of these 
settlements were encouraged by the United States claimants 
themselves, since a claimant’s only hope of obtaining any payment at 
all might lie in having his Government negotiate a diplomatic 
settlement on his behalf.”284 Finally, the Court pointed out that, 
between 1952 and the time of the decision, the President had entered 
 
 276. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 681–82; see also 50 U.S.C. §	1702 (2012). Notably, the 
IEEPA is still in force today; although there have been some amendments, the pertinent 
portions of the Act remain intact. See, e.g., §	1702(a)(1)(B).  
 277. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 678, 686. 
 278. See id. at 674. 
 279. Id. at 673. 
 280. Id. 
 281. Id. at 678. 
 282. Id.; see also id. at 686. (noting that the legislative history of the IEEPA “stressed 
that nothing in the IEEPA was to impede the settlement of claims of United States 
citizens”). This reasoning clearly evinces a functionalist approach to the matter. See supra 
notes 123–25 and accompanying text. 
 283. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 679–80. 
 284. Id. at 679. But see id. at 679–80 (“But it is also undisputed that the ‘United States 
has sometimes disposed of the claims of its citizens without their consent, or even without 
consultation with them, usually without exclusive regard for their interests, as 
distinguished from those of the nation as a whole.” (quoting LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 262–63 (1972))). 
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into at least ten binding settlements with foreign nations.285 Even 
without the advice and consent of the Senate, other cases have held 
that the President’s power to settle international claims is a “modest 
implied power”286 that is “integrally connected with normalizing 
United States’ relations with a foreign state.”287 
In Dames & Moore, the Court also considered whether the FSIA 
had any practical effect on the executive power to settle international 
claims.288 The Court held that the President had not altered the 
jurisdiction of the Article III courts in violation of the Constitution.289 
Further, the Court held, the FSIA was meant to remove one barrier 
to suit (namely, sovereign immunity), but did not prohibit the 
President from settling claims by American citizens against foreign 
sovereigns.290 
In sum, Dames & Moore sets out important guidelines for any 
President who might wish to nullify, void, or restructure judgments 
against a foreign sovereign. The unique context of the Dames & 
Moore case is important, though not determinative, in considering the 
weight that it should be given. It is notable that the President’s choice 
to move claims against Iran to a tribunal was part of an agreement to 
ensure the safe release of dozens of American hostages.291 Although 
the context is different today, the actors remain the same. Iran and 
the United States seek to enforce a mutual agreement that depends 
on navigating the complexities of the U.S. justice system. That mutual 
agreement would not culminate in the release of hostages, but it 
would culminate in an equally compelling result: compensating 
victims of terrorism and avoiding nuclear proliferation in the Middle 
East. 
B. Libyan Claims Resolution Act: Restructuring Judgments Against 
Libya 
Another, more recent, example of executive claims settlement is 
equally instructive. American relations with Libya remained 
tumultuous throughout much of the 1980s and 1990s.292 These 
 
 285. Id. at 680. 
 286. See, e.g., United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229–30 (1942). 
 287. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 683 (citing Pink, 315 U.S. at 229–30). 
 288. Id. at 684–85. 
 289. Id. 
 290. Id. at 685. 
 291. See supra text accompanying notes 267–69. 
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relations were particularly harmed by Libya’s terrorist attacks, 
including the 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103, which resulted in 
the deaths of hundreds of Americans.293 A number of lawsuits against 
Libya brought under the SST exception were filed as a result of this 
attack.294 In 2008, Congress passed the Libyan Claims Resolution Act 
(“LCRA”), which explicitly authorized the President to settle these 
claims.295 Following this authorization, President Bush promulgated 
Executive Order 13,477, which terminated all claims against Libya 
and required all existing judgments to be settled in accordance with 
the Claims Settlement Agreement reached with Libya.296 As part of 
this agreement, President Bush agreed to end Libya’s designation as a 
state sponsor of terror and lift remaining sanctions on the Libyan 
government.297 In return, the Libyan government paid around $4 
billion to victims of terror, including $2.7 billion to victims of the Pan 
Am bombing who were awarded damages based on a formula that 
gave $10 million for wrongful death claims and $3 million for personal 
injury claims.298 
 
attacks on American airplanes over the Mediterranean Sea, assassination attempts, air and 
sea battles, an attack on the U.S. embassy, and souring diplomatic relations).  
 293. Tony Burton, Pan Am Flight 103 Destroyed Midair over Lockerbie, Scotland in 
1988, Killing More Than 200 People, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Dec. 21, 2015, 11:55 AM), http://
www.nydailynews.com/news/world/pan-flight-103-destroyed-mid-air-lockerbie-1988-article-1
.2472679 [https://perma.cc/7GAZ-RW8S] (originally published Dec. 22, 1988); Sewell Chan, 





 294. See Rein v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 995 F. Supp. 325, 327 
(E.D.N.Y. 1998); Smith v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 886 F. Supp. 306, 
308–09 (E.D.N.Y. 1995). 
 295. Libyan Claims Resolution Act, Pub. L. No. 110-301, §	3, 122 Stat. 2999, 2999 
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 296. Exec. Order No. 13,477, 73 Fed. Reg. 65,965, 65,965–66 (Oct. 31, 2008). 
 297. See Press Release, Sec’y Condoleezza Rice, U.S. Dep’t of State, U.S. Diplomatic 
Relations with Libya (May 15, 2006), https://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/66235
.htm [https://perma.cc/T5GE-3CY4]; see also Eben Kaplan, How Libya Got off the List, 
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Oct. 16, 2007), http://www.cfr.org/libya/libya-got-off-
list/p10855 [https://perma.cc/SH9G-KUCB].  
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Soon after the agreement was reached, Assistant Secretary for 
Near Eastern Affairs David Welch of the George W. Bush 
administration gave insightful commentary on the utility of the 
arrangement.299 Welch noted that the United States and Libya had 
been working for a number of years on improving relations, but that 
“this relationship ha[d] been bedeviled by claims on both sides arising 
from these past incidents, and it’s been problematic to fix those.”300 
He also pointed out the agreement’s efficiency: “as compared to 
pursuing these claims through litigation, which can be time-
consuming, expensive and difficult to the victims involved, we thought 
that this offered a more promising route; that is, to use diplomacy to 
try and meet the expectations on all sides about how this might be 
done.”301 
The U.S. settlement and subsequent normalization with Libya 
stands as an attractive model for a President who hopes to settle 
similar claims against Iran. However, there are important differences. 
The sheer enormity of the claims pending against Iran is one major 
issue, whereas the judgments against Libya were comparatively 
miniscule (although still massive). Furthermore, President Bush’s 
executive order earned congressional support, putting it outside the 
realm of Justice Jackson’s “twilight zone.”302 Regardless, the 
successful recovery of fair compensation for victims of Libyan terror 
coupled with the normalization of relations with Libya embodied a 
win-win situation for the United States that American leaders should 
mimic with Iran. 
 
 299. C. David Welch, Assistant Sec’y for Near E. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, Briefing 
on the U.S.-Libya Comprehensive Claims Settlement Agreement in Wash., D.C. (Oct. 31, 
2008), http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rm/111493.htm [https://perma.cc/X3LN-5YQK].  
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 301. Id. As an interesting aside, Welch appeared uncomfortable when asked about the 
origins of the money used to compensate victims. One journalist implied that the funds 
came from American companies hoping to do business in Libya upon the termination of 
sanctions. Id. Also of note, the agreement contained a provision that required the United 
States to pay Libyan victims of American airstrikes a total of $300 million, underscoring 
the fact that the SST exception is rarely a one-way street. Id. 
 302. In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, Justice Jackson laid out his famous 
tripartite framework for determining the power of the President in foreign affairs. 343 U.S. 
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C. Takings Clause Issues 
Despite the presence of meaningful guidance, caution must be 
exercised when restructuring the SST judgments. In both Dames & 
Moore and in cases arising out of the LCRA, courts have shown a 
willingness to allow takings claims against the United States in cases 
where existing judgments are nullified and referred to a claims 
tribunal.303 A takings claim against the United States brought under 
the Fifth Amendment is ripe when an existing judgment is voided, 
referred to a claims tribunal, and the claims tribunal reaches a 
settlement decision the plaintiffs believe is insufficient.304 Although 
such a claim has not, to date, succeeded, the door for such claims was 
opened in Dames & Moore.305 The Court in Dames & Moore found 
that the takings claim was not ripe for review and disposed of the 
long-standing “treaty exception” to Court of Claims jurisdiction that 
previously foreclosed such claims.306 This move has potentially 
massive implications for the federal government when negotiating 
international settlement claims. If unhappy plaintiffs can bring takings 
claims against the government, the risk of astronomical judgments 
could shift from Iran to the U.S. Treasury.307 This must be a major 
consideration for the executive branch if SST judgments are to be 
restructured. 
 
 303. See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 689 (1981); Clay v. Socialist 
People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 614 F. Supp. 2d 21, 25 n.5 (D.D.C. 2009) (citing Dames 
& Moore, 543 U.S. at 689) (holding that, although the court would dismiss the case 
pursuant to executive orders, the plaintiffs were not precluded from bringing a Fifth 
Amendment takings claim in a separate proceeding); Harris v. Socialist People’s Libyan 
Arab Jamahiriya, 620 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 n.5 (D.D.C. 2009) (citing Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. 
at 689); Gartenstein-Ross, supra note 35, at 914. For a detailed discussion of takings claims 
under a settlement agreement, see Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Note, Resolving Outstanding 
Judgments Under the Terrorism Exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 77 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 496, 525–34 (2002). 
 304. See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 689; see also 13B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET 
AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §	3532.1.1 (3d ed. 2008).  
 305. See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 689; see also Gartenstein-Ross, supra note 35, at 
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 306. See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 689; see also Gartenstein-Ross, supra note 35, at 
915. 
 307. But see Gartenstein-Ross, supra note 35, at 917 n.5 (“Arguments can be advanced 
in favor of the Executive’s ability to terminate the judgments. The Court’s discussion of 
the treaty exception [in Dames & Moore] is dicta, and the Court is free to take a different 
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D. The Path to Protecting the Accord 
After reviewing the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal and the resolution 
of claims against Libya, it is clear that buried underneath the piles of 
litigation documents filed by SST plaintiffs there is a path for the 
President to void, nullify, or restructure the judgments that have been 
imposed against Iran.308 While the exact contours of that path are 
unclear, there are at least two alternative options for the President. 
First, the President could attempt to work with Congress. If the 
President could convince Congress to pass something along the lines 
of the LRCA, he would have express congressional permission to 
settle claims filed against Iran through a tribunal or according to a 
formula. Another option that could help limit the continued 
imposition of judgments against Iran would be to repeal or amend 
some aspects of the SST exception. As the negative effects of the SST 
exception coincide with critiques of JASTA,309 some speculate that 
“members of Congress and their staffs	.	.	.	will want to respond with 
new legislation.”310 However, considering the current state of 
Congress, the politicized nature of these judgments, and the 
emotional appeal of the underlying events giving rise to them,311 the 
President would be well advised to prepare a plan that does not 
require explicit congressional approval. 
As demonstrated by Dames & Moore, the President can take 
steps to settle international claims without express congressional 
approval if the “general tenor” of legislation and historical practice 
supports such activity.312 The legislation cited in Dames & Moore that 
gave rise to the “general tenor” of congressional intent in that case 
still exists, in large part, today.313 One potential roadblock to this 
solution is that the IEEPA requires a state of national emergency 
 
 308. It is worth noting that this Comment proposes a means of dealing with the claims 
against Iran specifically; others have discussed a range of methods by which the SST 
exception, on a more general level, might be improved upon. See, e.g., Ward, supra note 
86, at 18–20 (proposing the establishment of a “terrorism court” at the U.N. in place of the 
SST exception). 
 309. Karen Halverson, Is a Foreign State a “Person”? Does it Matter?: Personal 
Jurisdiction, Due Process, and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. 
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 311. See supra Section II.D. 
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declared on legitimate grounds before it can be invoked.314 In the 
past, President Bush invoked his powers under the IEEPA to limit 
the ability of plaintiffs to attach assets belonging to the government of 
Iraq.315 Through executive order, President Bush declared that the 
attachment proceedings obstructed the orderly reconstruction of Iraq 
and the maintenance of peace in Iraq, thereby creating an 
“extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of 
the United States.”316 Clearly, the “national security threat” threshold 
is not very difficult to meet. As discussed earlier, protecting the 
Accord is likely to pass such a test with flying colors.317 Thus, the 
President can rely on the express grants of authority contained in the 
IEEPA318 to buttress executive nullification of existing claims against 
Iran. The President also finds support for settling the claims on the 
basis of congressional acquiescence through the International Claims 
Settlement Act of 1949, as noted by the Dames & Moore decision.319 
Furthermore, Congress has been unable to pass legislation, or 
even a resolution, that expresses any level of discontent or 
disapproval of the President pursuing a comprehensive settlement 
agreement with Iran regarding the SST judgments. This is a factor 
that was noted as a key component to the Court’s decision in Dames 
& Moore.320 An expression of congressional disapproval would place 
the President at the “lowest ebb” in presidential power, forcing 
 
 314. 50 U.S.C. §	1701(a) (2012) (“Any authority granted to the President by section 
1702 of this title may be exercised to deal with any unusual and extraordinary threat, 
which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national 
security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States, if the President declares a 
national emergency with respect to such threat.”). 
 315. Exec. Order No. 13,303, 68 Fed. Reg. 31,931, 31,931–32 (May 22, 2003) (“[T]he 
threat of attachment	.	.	.	obstructs the orderly reconstruction of Iraq, the restoration and 
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extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States and I 
hereby declare a national emergency to deal with that threat.”). 
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 317. See supra Part II. 
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 319. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 680 (1981) (“The Act had two purposes: 
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claims settlement with Yugoslavia, and (2) to provide a procedure whereby funds resulting 
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International Claims Commission, now the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, and 
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States nationals against settlement funds.”). 
 320. Id. at 687–88. 
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reliance on inherent presidential powers alone.321 Proving that the 
President has the inherent power to interfere with final judgments 
reached by the judiciary would implicate serious separation-of-powers 
concerns. However, in the absence of disapproving legislation or 
resolution, the President’s power remains at its highest peak, as 
demonstrated above. 
If the President finds it wise to negotiate a comprehensive 
settlement agreement with Iran in order to protect the Accord, he can 
buttress his constitutional strength by creating an alternative forum 
that can provide “meaningful relief.”322 The President might also 
satisfy claimants by creating a forum that lifts various jurisdictional 
and procedural impediments to recovery traditionally faced in U.S. 
courts.323 Furthermore, many of these plaintiffs would be more than 
happy to recover something (rather than nothing) for the immense 
grief and pain they have suffered, and a settlement agreement could 
ensure such a result. SST plaintiffs are unlikely to subscribe to an all-
or-nothing ideology. A comprehensive settlement agreement would 
serve as an efficient means of compensating victims of state-
sponsored terror.324 
Although the legal path to a comprehensive settlement plan with 
Iran may appear somewhat straight and narrow, there are various 
obstacles along the way. First, the United States does not currently 
hold the same leverage over Iran that it held over Libya. Libya had 
something to gain by reaching a settlement agreement with the 
United States, namely, the lifting of economic sanctions. Iran has 
already achieved this goal (although there is much to be improved 
upon). However, the United States can still use Iran’s status as a state 
sponsor of terror as a carrot to bring them to the negotiation table. 
Iran might be enticed by the possibility of doing away with its 
designation as a state sponsor of terror. 
Another obstacle specific to Iran (and distinguishing Iran’s case 
from Libya’s situation) is the sheer enormity of the judgments levied 
against them. Even a settlement that awards twenty cents on the 
dollar to every plaintiff would result in more than $8 billion in 
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liability. The size of these numbers may steer Iran away from the 
negotiating table. However, this problem can be remedied by 
leveraging the immense economic trade and growth that is possible if 
the Accord holds up and Iran reenters the international economy.325 
CONCLUSION 
John Kees is a man from Fort Mill, South Carolina.326 Members 
of Hezbollah killed his father, Marion Kees, in 1983 when the U.S. 
Marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon, was blown up by a bomb 
smuggled into the complex.327 John was eleven years old when his 
father was killed.328 Stories like John’s are repeated time and again in 
the annals of the U.S. court system.329 These horrendous acts of 
violence are detailed on thousands and thousands of pages of court 
documents. Sometimes the details are broadcasted to congressional 
committees or spewed across the airwaves to millions of Americans. 
Through the SST exception to the FSIA, Congress acted upon the 
understandable temptation to make someone pay for acts of violence 
like these. Today, the results of such a decision are on full display. 
The SST exception has allowed billions of dollars in judgments to pile 
up. Very few plaintiffs have been paid. Very few international 
terrorist groups have been deterred. But now, despite these costs, the 
litigious offspring of the exception threaten an Accord that, if 
successful, could avert mass violent confrontation in the Middle East. 
The things that have happened to people like Marion Kees are 
unconscionable. But the SST exception has proven to be an ill-fated 
method of recourse. As John Kees said about his lawsuit to recover 
damages for his father’s death, “[I]t won’t bring back my dad. I was 
robbed of that years ago.”330 Despite the various objections to the 
exception, it has existed in full force for nearly two decades. Today, 
judgments reached pursuant to the exception constitute substantial 
obstacles to the Accord. The goals of compensating John Kees and 
other victims of state-sponsored terror, preserving the Accord, and 
maintaining the President’s foreign policy flexibility appear polarized. 
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This Comment contends that, in fact, these goals are commensurate 
with one another—the achievement of one need not come at the 
expense of the others. 
If the judgments stand as they are, they are likely to destroy the 
very bargain that drew Iran and the United States to reach the 
Accord in the first place. Iran will lose access to some of its blocked 
funds and will be dissuaded from participating in the international 
economy if the judgments are enforced in full. As Iran seeks 
international economic integration, it will face obstructions at every 
turn if investments abroad can be liquidated and attached by plaintiffs 
seeking to collect their judgments. Meanwhile, if the judgments are 
enforced, the United States may see Iran resume intensive uranium 
production in response. Furthermore, hardliners in Iran will reduce 
the influence of American soft power because trading with the West 
would result in the attachment of assets. 
For these reasons, Iran and the United States must take action to 
ensure that SST judgments do not become the proverbial “Achilles’ 
heel” of the Accord. For Iran, this means coming to court and putting 
an end to default judgments that allow inherently biased decisions in 
favor of SST plaintiffs. For the United States, this means taking 
executive action that will bring Iran to the negotiating table and 
convince Iran to immediately pay at least a portion of the outstanding 
judgments. Congressional support may be an advantage, but explicit 
authorization does not appear to be a requirement if the President 
wishes to take such action under the authority of the IEEPA and 
other statutes. 
Preserving the Accord and providing relief to victims’ families is 
ideal for both parties. SST plaintiffs would gain access to the 
compensation they deserve. The United States would maintain an 
Accord that took years to construct and that allows the United States 
to exercise more influence via soft power than previously existed. 
Iranian moderates would be able to continue their quest for 
normalization and integration within the world economy.331 Most of 
all, one less country will be on the path towards a nuclear weapon, 
and the United States will avoid another military confrontation in the 
Middle East. To allow a few isolated (yet deserving) plaintiffs to 
inadvertently obstruct an international agreement that seeks to 
protect the security of the United States and the world would be a 
regrettable commentary on the current state of American-style 
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litigation. The United States and Iran should immediately work to 
avert such a result. Through such a solution, the United States and 
Iran may fulfill the venerable vision articulated by President John F. 
Kennedy so many years ago when he implored us to “focus	.	.	.	on a 
more practical, more attainable peace, based not on a sudden 
revolution in human nature but on a gradual evolution in human 
institutions[.]”332 
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